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UNHEALTHY DETERMINATIONS:
CONTROLLING “MEDICAL NECESSITY”

Janet L. Dolgin
The notion of medical necessity has been the operative tool
through which healthcare coverage determinations in the United
States have been rendered and justified. Now, for most people,
decisions about coverage translate into decisions about
healthcare since few people can afford to pay for their own
healthcare. The notion of medical necessity constitutes a
necessary component of any healthcare system that is committed
to providing high-quality healthcare at a sustainable cost. In
practice, however, reliance on medical necessity to determine
healthcare coverage is only as productive as the larger health
care system within which medical necessity determinations occur.
Definitions of both “medical” and “necessity” are flexible and
interpretations are varied. As a result, the value of medical
necessity determinations depends on the character of a nation’s
healthcare delivery and payment structure and on the identity of
those rendering medical necessity determinations.
INTRODUCTION

T

HE notion of “medical necessity” sits at the center of cost containment efforts in the healthcare arena. 1 Reasonable on its face, the
notion can be used to serve population health, or to serve the interests of
those in control of health care. It can be used to justify decisions that
protect the population from wasteful spending, as well as decisions that
serve commercial or ideological interests. In fact, the notion of medical
necessity is less a tool for rendering fair and efficient decisions about the
provision of health care than a lens through which to view the underside
of prevailing healthcare delivery and payment systems in the United
States through the last century. 2 The shifting interests that have shaped
U.S. health care can be delineated through an examination of the uses to
which the notion of medical necessity has been put over time. This is
notable in that medical necessity – who determines it and how – has not
generally been at the forefront of debate about reforming the nation’s
healthcare system. The notion facilitates decision-making about

1

William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53
DUKE L.J. 597 (2003).
2
Before the passage of Medicare in 1965, medical necessity determinations
were of comparatively insignificant moment. See infra Section II.A. That is
suggestive of the character of the nation’s healthcare system before the 1960s.
See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 3–29,
61–63, 291–310 (1982).
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healthcare payments and thus about healthcare delivery (since very few
people can afford to pay out-of-pocket for health care). Yet, the notion
and its uses are rarely invoked in analyses of health care in the United
States.
In fact, healthcare payers in the United States have relied on medical
necessity since the nineteenth century to assess healthcare claims submitted by patients and clinicians. 3 Yet, this reliance should not be taken
to suggest a consistent vision of healthcare payment or delivery, of who
should receive care for which medical interventions, and of who should
benefit financially. This Article explores reliance on the notion of medical necessity in U.S. healthcare systems over time and suggests that, despite reasonable presumptions, the notion does not shape healthcare coverage decisions. Rather, it is powerful precisely because it bends to
shifting visions of how health care should be delivered and financed.
Analysis of the notion thereby offers a framework within which to outline and interpret the history of the nation’s healthcare system, and within which to assess the strength of the nation’s current commitment to
increasing access to healthcare coverage.
Part I of this Article reviews definitions of medical necessity constructed by physicians’ groups, the insurance industry, and the government. Almost all seem reasonable on their face, yet both the term “medical” and the term “necessity” defy definitional precision. Accordingly,
virtually all definitions of medical necessity are open to discrepant interpretations. Further, Part I suggests that the risk that such definitions will
fall prey to economic and ideological interests not connected with, or
even in conflict with, patients’ interests is magnified because of the
enormity of the claims-review system(s) and the absence of transparency
in the review process.
Part II then outlines the role of medical necessity determinations in
shaping health care in the United States between the end of the nineteenth century and the present. In that history, medical necessity determinations offer an accurate reflector of shifts in the nation’s system for
delivering and paying for health care. By the last decades of the twentieth century, medical necessity determinations had emerged clearly as the
operative concept around which healthcare coverage decision-making
was entertained and justified. Yet, the force of the notion lies in its openness to diverse interpretations that, variously, can serve patient health or
partisan interests.
Finally, Part III suggests two sets of reparative responses to the inconsistency and unfairness that can mark medical necessity determinations. One set rests on the assumption that health-insurance companies
will continue to play a central role in structuring healthcare payments
and delivery in the United States. The second assumes a healthcare sys-

3

See infra Section II.A.

438

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 22:3

tem less dependent on serving the interests of the health-insurance industry than that now in place in the United States.
I. MEDICAL NECESSITY – A TERM IN SEARCH OF AN AGENDA
Specific definitions of medical necessity are less important than the
overarching framework within which coverage determinations occur.
Individual determinations about healthcare coverage reflect the particular decision-maker, and the social and economic frame within which he
or she is rendering coverage determinations, far more than they reflect
formal definitions of medical necessity. 4 In fact, a review of extant definitions shows most to be sensible efforts to provide care if “necessary,”
but such definitions have been open to heterogeneous interpretations. 5 In
practice, understandings of “medical” care vary as widely as understandings of “necessary” care.
A. Definitions of Medical Necessity
The notion of medical necessity as a means of assessing healthcare
claims is distinct from the notion as it may relate to coverage decisions.
The latter involves broad-based policy decisions about coverage, implicates large categories of conditions and modes of care, and thus carries
direct, and comparatively clear-cut consequences for the coverage of
large populations. 6 In contrast, the notion of medical necessity is applied
to individual claims for coverage. This has entailed thousands upon
thousands of decisions, each largely dependent on the facts of individual
claims.
Validation of the notion of medical necessity and development of
methods for implementing the notion would seem basic to any healthcare
system that is anxious both to provide adequate care and contain costs. 7
Many professional, private, and governmental definitions of medical
necessity support those presumptions. But various stakeholders assume
different interpretations of the phrase. 8 In 2003, William Sage noted a
consistent discrepancy in clinicians’ and insurers’ perspectives on medical necessity:
To many physicians, the phrase “not medically necessary” means “not clinically indicated,” which makes

4

Sara J. Singer & Linda A. Bergthold, Prospects for Improved Decision
Making About Medical Necessity: A Group Process Approach to Demystifying
Decisions of Medical Necessity in Managed Care Plans, 20 HEALTH AFF. 200,
202 (2001).
5
See infra text accompanying notes 6–26.
6
Singer & Bergthold, supra note 4, at 200.
7
Edward B. Hirshfeld & Gail H. Thomason, Medical Necessity Determinations: The Need for a New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 19–20 (1966).
8
Sage, supra note 1.
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them question why a seemingly nonprofessional party
such as a health plan has the right to challenge their professional opinion. To many health plans, it means “not
covered even though not expressly excluded from coverage,” which gives them a degree of comfort issuing
denials based on established insurance practice even
though such decisions outrage physicians. 9
A 2011 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report described “medical necessity reviews” as shaping the context within which “the tough decisions on coverage are made.” 10 On its face, the notion of “medical necessity” as a tool for assessing requests for coverage of recommended or
provided medical care is straightforward and reasonable. Medically necessary care would seem to be coincident, as a theoretical matter, with
good care. 11 Again, in theory, medical necessity reviews should be able
to limit costs in a reasonable manner, even improving a population’s
health status as it cuts healthcare costs. 12 Indeed, it can no longer be as13
In the 1980s, studies
sumed that limiting costs undermines care.
demonstrated clearly that different rates of care do not necessarily result
in differences in population health status (assuming, of course, that basic
healthcare needs are met). 14 Ethics and finances alike suggest that health

9

Id. at 601.
INST. OF MED., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE
AND COST 9 (Cheryl Ulmer et al. eds., 2011), http://www.nap.edu/
catalog/13234/essential-health-benefits-balancing-coverage-and-cost.
11
Coverage decisions are generally distinguished from medical necessity
decisions. Yet, there is some variation in how the difference is understood. The
first are usually understood as involving broad policies describing the types of
care that are available to a specific population (for instance, pursuant to a particular health insurance plan). The second are usually understood as involving
applications of covered benefits to individuals (decisions about how to implement covered care in light of a wide variety of factors, like medical need and
cost). See Singer & Bergthold, supra note 4, at 200. In 1998-1999 in California,
however, provider groups and health plans distinguished medical necessity decisions and coverage decisions differently. INST. OF MED., supra note 10, at 23;
Sage, supra note 1, at 603.
12
See Ryan Abbott & Carl Stevens, Redefining Medical Necessity: A Consumer-Driven Solution to the U.S. Health Care Crisis, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943,
943 (2014) (noting that an estimated 750 billion dollars is wasted each year on
unnecessary health care).
13
See Susan Dentzer, Editorial, The ‘Triple Aim’ Goes Global, and Not a
Minute Too Soon, 32 HEALTH AFF. 638 (2013) (noting that coverage and payment policies can result in cost containment without undermining good care).
The “triple aim” looks to “better health, better care, and lower costs.” Id.
14
Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 7, at 19 (citing Lucian L. Leape,
Practice Guidelines and Standards: An Overview, 16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 42,
42 (1990)).
10
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care should not be provided if unnecessary – that it should not be used
wastefully.
Various definitions – some crafted by professional groups, others by
insurance companies, courts, or government commissions – generally
reflect similar concerns. A 2005 definition of medical necessity offered
by the American Medical Association described the notion in the context
of a “prudent” physician’s provision of medical care aimed at “preventing, diagnosing[,] or treating an illness, injury, disease or its symptoms.” 15 The definition further specified that the care provided should be:
(a) in accordance with generally accepted standards
of medical practice;
(b) clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency,
extent, site, and duration;
and (c) not primarily for the economic benefit of the
health plans and purchasers or for the convenience
of the patient, treating physician, or other health
care provider. 16

Another definition, crafted by a group of researchers at Stanford at
the end of the twentieth century, proposed that care should be
deemed medically necessary if recommended by a patient’s doctor
and found by the patient’s insurer to meet factors linked to “medical purpose, scope, evidence, and value.” 17
Still another definition of medical necessity, developed as part of a
settlement agreement in In re Managed Care Litigation, 18 harmonizes
with the Stanford definition’s focus on purpose, scope, evidence, and
value as well as the one offered by the AMA. 19 The suit – a class-action,
initiated in the early 2000s by over 900,000 healthcare providers 20 – was
15

H-320.953: Definitions of “Screening” and “Medical Necessity”, AM.
MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/ssl3/ecomm/PolicyFinderForm.pl?
site=www.ama-assn.org&uri=/resources/html/PolicyFinder/policyfiles/HnE/H320.953.HTM (last visited May 20, 2015).
16
Id.
17
INST. OF MED., supra note 10. “Medical purpose” involves an “intervention for the purpose of treating a medical condition,” “scope” refers to “the most
appropriate supply or level of service, considering potential benefits and harms
to the patient,” “evidence” relates to knowledge that an intervention is “effective
in improving health outcomes,” and “value” allows for consideration of whether
an intervention is “cost-effective for this condition compared to alternative interventions, including no intervention . . .” Id. at 97 tbl. 5-7. The Stanford definition was used by some state’s Medicaid programs and in a few insurance contracts. Id. at 96.
18
In re Managed Care Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
19
See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
20
Mark H. Gallant & Kevin D. Gordon, Two Ps in a Pod Emerging Issues
in Provider-Plan Litigation, AHLA-PAPERS P06240707 (2007).
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commenced in a federal district court in Florida and involved claims
against 13 insurance companies. 21
The settlement agreement defined medical necessity to mean:
[H]ealth care services that a physician, exercising prudent clinical judgment, would provide to a patient for
the purpose of preventing, evaluating, diagnosing or
treating an illness, injury, disease or its symptoms, and
that are: a) in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice; b) clinically appropriate, in
terms of type, frequency, extent, site and duration, and
considered effective for the patient's illness, injury or
disease; and c) not primarily for the convenience of the
patient, physician or other health care provider, and not
more costly than an alternative service or sequence of
services at least as likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or diagnostic results as to the diagnosis or treatment of that patient's illness, injury or disease. For these
purposes, “generally accepted standards of medical
practice” means standards that are based on credible scientific evidence published in peer-reviewed medical literature generally recognized by the relevant medical
community or otherwise consistent with the standards
set forth in policy issues involving clinical judgment. 22
Additionally, Medicare’s website for patient-viewers defines “medically necessary” as “[h]ealth care services or supplies needed to prevent,
diagnose, or treat an illness, injury, condition, disease, or its symptoms
and that meet accepted standards of medicine.” 23 Finally, Medicaid, a
joint federal-state program, does not offer a national definition of medical necessity (or medically necessary); instead, it leaves that task to the
states. 24
On their face, none of these definitions is objectionable. Each provides, more or less explicitly, for a patient’s clinician and insurer to determine coverage for care in light of a set of factors (such as the purpose
of the care and its likely benefit or harm to the patient). Yet, medical necessity determinations are ultimately made at the level of the individual

21

Managed Care Litig., 298 F. Supp. at 1249. The insurance companies included Aetna, CIGNA, Health Net, Prudential, Anthem/Well Point, and Humana.
Id. at 1271 n. 2, 1272 n. 4.
22
INST. OF MED., supra note 10, at 228.
23
Glossary-M, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/glossary/m.html
(last visited May 20, 2015).
24
INST. OF MED., supra note 10, app. G at 229; see also 42 U.S.C.A. §
1369d (West 2014).
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patient, and the definitions noted here allow for wide interpretive berth
as they are applied to particular cases. 25
Soon after passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“Affordable Care Act”) 26 in 2010, the IOM explored the possibility of
designing a national definition of medical necessity and interpretive
guidelines to use in making such determinations. 27 If developed and
implemented as a set of interpretive guidelines – far more crucial than
another effort to define the phrase 28 – the effort might have mitigated
some of the frustrations flowing from the current methods – largely ad
hoc – for determining medical necessity. Even more, if the many stakeholders with conflicting views of medical necessity determinations could
collaborate in developing a consistent approach, the nation’s healthcare
system and thus its population would benefit. But the IOM found that
stakeholders continue to adhere to sharply divergent visions of how best
to define and interpret medical necessity in coverage contexts. Essentially, clinicians and the public favor development of national standards.29
But private insurers, who have long sat at the center of medical necessity
determinations of both private and public healthcare plans, favor preservation of the present system. 30 In justifying that view, they invoked a
provision in the Affordable Care Act that allows “insurers ‘flexibility to
employ appropriate medical review and determination of medical necessity.’” 31
As long as the insurance industry sits at the center of the delivery
and coverage of health care in the United States – a reality reinforced by
the Affordable Care Act – it will be difficult, if not impossible, to create
an efficient, comprehensive set of guidelines for determining the necessity of care and thus the obligation of payers to cover it. 32 Even more, it
will be difficult, though not impossible, to demand transparency in the
25

In defining the terms of coverage for children and adolescent patients,
Medicaid has noted that medical necessity determinations “must be made on a
case-by-case basis.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EPSDT—A
GUIDE FOR STATES: COVERAGE IN THE MEDICAID BENEFIT FOR CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS 23 (2014), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-ProgramInformation/By-Topics/Benefits/Downloads/EPSDT_Coverage_Guide.pdf.
26
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. 111-152 (2010) (West 2012) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Affordable Care Act].
27
INST. OF MED., supra note 10, at 5–23.
28
See supra notes 6–26 and accompanying text.
29
INST. OF MED., supra note 10, at 5–23.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Other nations have developed a more consistent and comprehensive understanding of medical necessity as well as procedural methods that allow
changes in understanding over time. See infra Section III.B.
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33
process through which insurers reach medical necessity decisions. At
present, the definition of medical necessity remains in the hands of those
with commercial interests. Most operative definitions of medical necessity in the United States stem from within the insurance industry and are
included in industry contracts. 34
Still more important, at the level of medical necessity determination,
whether coverage is extended or denied in particular cases continues to
depend on a slew of factors including, most importantly, the name, position, and motives (both express and implicit) of the decision-makers, as
well as the shifting economic and political choices of payers (by whom
the decision-makers are usually employed, either directly or indirectly).
In short, medical necessity determinations depend on the knowledge,
politics, motives, and inclinations of those who render them far more
than they depend on objective truths. 35 In Daniel Skinner’s phrase, determinations of medical necessity “can just as easily be deployed to help
people gain access to care as to limit it.” 36 Empirical evidence is too often displaced in medical necessity determinations by the motives, express and implicit, of those with the authority to make the determinations. 37 In other words, formal definitions of medical necessity can mask
a slew of individual determinations that do not serve particular patients
or the population of which those patients are part.

B. Who Decides, Why, and at What Cost?
Since the creation of Medicare in 1965, the insurance industry has
occupied a privileged position in rendering medical necessity determinations – the rationale in terms of which health care is apportioned. 38 This
has been consequential in shaping the nation’s healthcare system. 39 The
key role insurance companies play in determining who gets health care
and under what circumstances is a product of Congress’s decision, in

33

See infra Part III (recommending a need for greater transparency).
SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., MEDICAL
NECESSITY IN PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
CARE
1
(2003),
http://publichealth.gwu.edu/departments/healthpolicy/
DHP_Publications/pub_uploads/dhpPublication_3A45C497-5056-9D203DAA24F165B5678A.pdf (last visited May 20, 2015).
35
Daniel Skinner, The Politics of Medical Necessity in American Abortion
Debates, 8 POL. & GENDER 1, 3 (2012).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See infra Section I.B.1.
39
Barbara L. Atwell, Mainstreaming Complementary and Alternative Medicine in the Face of Uncertainty, 72 UMKC L. REV. 593, 597–98 (2004); see
infra Section I.B.1 (noting role given to private insurers in determining medical
necessity for Medicare patients).
34
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fashioning Medicare a half-century ago, to hire third-party contractors to
review medical claims and make payments to Medicare providers.40
1. Who Decides?
In the United States, almost all medical necessity determinations,
both for patients with private coverage and for those covered through
government programs, are made by insurance company employees. In
the case of Medicare patients, coverage determinations are rendered pursuant to contracts between the companies and Medicare.41 Most insurance companies rely on nurses to make initial decisions about the coverage of submitted claims in light of “usual and customary” standards of
practice. 42 Denials are reviewed by physicians employed by the relevant
insurance company. 43 A study of medical necessity determinations in
California in the 1990s found that contractual definitions of medical necessity were less important than other factors in explaining particular
determinations and reported significant variation in how determinations
were rendered. 44
In the years immediately following Medicare’s passage, Blue Cross
and Blue Shield plans were given the majority of third-party Medicare
contractor positions. At the time, the “Blues” were nonprofits. 45 Soon
private insurers also obtained many of the contractor positions. 46 This
placed a central component of the administration of the Medicare program – the review of claims and payments or denials – with third-party
contractors, primarily insurance companies (increasingly commercial
entities). The Medicare model, originally passed to ease physicians’ concern about a governmental take-over of medicine, has remained in place
since Medicare’s implementation. It has had far-reaching consequences.
Even beyond the delegation to third parties of central administrative
tasks, the model has empowered the insurance industry and limited opportunities for constructing a one-payer healthcare system in the United
States. 47 Applicable definitions of medical necessity have almost invariably been susceptible to heterogeneous interpretations, largely dependent

40

See infra Section I.B.1.
See infra Section II.B.
42
Atwell, supra note 39, at 598.
43
Id.
44
Singer & Bergthold, supra note 4, at 202.
45
Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2005).
Hermer notes that the “Blues” began to seek for-profit status once it became
clear that they could not successfully compete with companies that relied on
experience rating in their underwriting. Id. at 10–11.
46
Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t
Worked, 101 GEO. L.J. 519, 527 (2013).
47
See infra Part III.
41
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on the motives – both implicit and explicit – of those responsible for reviewing medical claims. With a focus on limiting costs, insurers’ determinations cannot be expected to, and have not always, served patients. 48
2. Beyond Definitions: Other Factors Motivating Medical Necessity
Determinations
The industry’s economic motives can privilege considerations about
cost over those about quality of care. Further, the approval or refusal of
medical claims can reflect ideological or political agendas. 49 Insurers
collect premiums before care is rendered. The fewer claims that an insurance company pays, the greater the company’s profits.50 But the flexibility of almost all definitions of medical necessity can make it difficult
to discern economic motives that undermine the provision of good health
care.51 Gregg Bloche has contended that insurance companies’ reliance
on the notion of medical necessity in reviewing medical claims can be an
opaque form of rationing, grounded not in concern for the potential advantages of the intervention at issue, but in concern for cost. 52
In addition to economic interests, ideological interests shape medical
necessity decisions. A diverse set of groups has invoked the notion of
medical necessity variously to further or to stymie various agendas. For
instance, anti-abortion groups deny that abortion can be justified medically and that, accordingly, claims for covering abortions should be denied on the grounds that they are not medically necessary. 53 Another instance involves patients and clinicians favoring complementary and
alternative (CAM) modes of care. They may face coverage denials insofar as CAM interventions may be unusual, may appear to be experi-

48

Hermer, supra note 45, at 27–28.
Sage, supra note 1, at 604.
50
Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Models of Rationing: Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1668 (1992).
Self-insured claims raise different issues since insurance companies are only
paid to administer such claims and not to pay them out. Id.
51
Sage, supra note 1, at 604.
52
M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH: WHY DOCTORS ARE
UNDER PRESSURE TO RATION CARE, PRACTICE POLITICS, AND COMPROMISE
THEIR PROMISE TO HEAL 11 (2011); see also B. Jessie Hill, What Is the Meaning
of Health? Constitutional Implications of Defining “Medical Necessity” and
“Essential Health Benefits” Under the Affordable Care Act, 38 AM. J.L. &
MED. 445, 449 (2012) (considering Bloche’s claim). Within the last decade and
a half, the industry has often preferred to “pass-through” coverage expenses
rather than deny coverage, replacing a pattern of coverage denials with higher
premiums. Mark A. Hall, State Regulation of Medical Necessity: The Case of
Weight-Reduction Surgery, 53 DUKE L.J. 653, 671 (2003).
53
See Skinner, supra note 35, at 14–16.
49
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mental (even when they are not), and are less often approved in mainstream medical literature than more traditional forms of care. 54
Mark Hall reported on another example – grounded in different visions of the division between medical and cosmetic care more than ideology. The case at issue occurred in the early 2000s when insurance
companies hesitated to cover bariatric surgery. 55 Hall identified a trend
against any coverage for the procedure on the grounds that it was cosmetic, almost never medically necessary, and thus almost always deemed
appropriately excluded from coverage. 56
3. Costly Duplication of Effort
The development and widespread appropriation of the Medicare
model – which handed over to the insurance industry the power to make
healthcare coverage decisions on the basis of flexible definitions – has
resulted in an enormous group of decision-makers who render determinations notable for idiosyncratic variations.57 These determinations have
no precedential value, unless refusals are appealed. The magnitude of
duplicated efforts is costly, with medical necessity determinations stemming from thousands of decision-makers. In short, the system is inconsistent and wasteful and would seem, even on its face, to elide – or even
undermine – the creation of a set of rules that could restrain costs while
improving the quality of the nation’s health.

54

See Atwell, supra note 39, at 594, 607–10. Atwell suggests that relying
centrally on evidence-based medicine “overlooks the premise that medicine is
not just a science, but an art. To try to impose a ‘one size fits all’ generalized
standard undermines the importance of clinical evaluation.” Id. at 604 (citing
Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care is Medically
Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 231 (1999)).
55
Hall, supra note 52, at 662. Today, bariatric surgery is often covered, if
“specific criteria are met.” Insurance FAQs, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA HEALTH CARE,
https://www.uihealthcare.org/otherservices.aspx?id=22485 (last visited May 20,
2015). This may, in part, reflect the nation’s focus on the health risks of obesity.
One website describing bariatric surgery notes that insurance companies will
generally cover the procedure if a patient “meets patient criteria and medical
necessity is established,” requires providing a Letter of Medical Necessity from
the
patient’s
physician.
Medical
Necessity,
BARIATRIC.US,
http://www.bariatric.us/medical-necessity.html (last visited May 20, 2015).
56
Hall, supra note 52, at 669.
57
At the end of 2013, over 460,000 Medicare appeals were pending before
the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals. As a result, the agency suspended
assignments of appeals for 28 months. Christopher P. Brewer, Hospitals File
Lawsuit Over Medicare Administrative Law Judge Hearings Delays, THE NAT’L
LAW REVIEW (July 24, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/hospitalsfile-lawsuit-over-medicare-administrative-law-judge-hearings-delays
(attributing increase in number of appeals to “expanded number of Medicare contractors reviewing claims and the expanded volume of claims reviews”).
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II. THE STORY OF MEDICAL NECESSITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The broad reliance of the U.S. healthcare system on private insurers
to determine the medical necessity of care – and thus to determine
whether particular healthcare interventions are covered by insurance – is
a product of developments in the 1960s that led to the passage of Medicare. 58 This Part reviews the nation’s understanding and use of medical
necessity determinations before that time, the impact of Medicare’s deference to industry in reaching medical necessity decisions, the reshaping of that deference more fully to serve industry in the 1980s and
1990s, and, finally, the effects of the Affordable Care Act on determinations of medical necessity. At each stage, the notion of medical necessity
has not so much determined, as it has reflected, the nation’s approach to
healthcare delivery and coverage. At each stage of this history, the nation
has failed to look to the notion of medical necessity as a theoretical
ground on which to contemplate how best to construct a system offering
high quality, sustainable health care. Rather, the notion of medical necessity emerges, again and again, as a deus ex machina – a tool through
which shifting approaches to healthcare delivery and coverage have been
implemented and justified.
A. Early Uses of the Notion of Medical Necessity in the United States
Until the 1960s, the notion of medical necessity enjoyed a subservient role in the U.S. healthcare system. That role harmonized with a
healthcare system that gave significant control to individual physicians
whose medical decisions were rarely upended by anyone – including
patients. It was an age that assumed a paternalistic relationship between
patient and doctor in which patients rarely challenged physicians’ medical decisions. 59
Between the late 1800s and the middle of the twentieth century,
courts relied on the notion of medical necessity in attempting to settle
disputes involving some combination of patients, physicians, and the
government. These cases involved a wide variety of issues and did not
focus, in particular, on payment disputes. Although some involved questions about payment, 60 others involved disputes about the character of
care provided 61 or about justifications for medical interventions. 62 In
58

See infra Section II.B.1.
STARR, supra note 2, at 235–36.
60
See, e.g., Dauterive v. Sternfels, 164 So. 349 (La. Ct. App. 1935) (relieving husband of obligation to pay medical bills for wife after couple separated
even though the medical care was “necessary,” and placing the obligation to pay
on the patient herself).
61
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Minor, 11 S.W. 472 (Ky. 1889) (involving
dispute about prescription of whiskey as form of medical care).
62
See, e.g., Davis v. Walton, 276 P. 921 (Utah 1929) (reversing an order authorizing sterilization of prisoner who was convicted of robbery).
59
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these cases, the definition of medical necessity was not always explicit,
but the identity of the decision-maker was.
One of the first uses of the term “medical necessity” by a court in the
United States involved questions about the right of a physician to prescribe whiskey in the face of a county rule that prohibited the sale of
“spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors in said county as a beverage.” 63 The
rule contained an exception for a physician prescribing liquor for a patient who was found to be “actually sick.” 64 In effect, the rule provided
for doctors to prescribe whiskey if deemed medically necessary. Decided
in 1889, Commonwealth v. Minor put the burden on the doctor to show
that “the whiskey was needed as a medicine by the person [another doctor] for whom it was prescribed.” 65 The Kentucky court that entertained
this dispute explained that “medical science” is a complicated field that
“is progressing,” but that it will always elude perfection. 66 Within that
framework – and sounding quite modern – the court noted that “new diseases” and new “remedies” appear with great frequency. As a result, the
court opined, there could be no hard and fast rules within medicine about
how best to care for patients. Kentucky law categorized whiskey as a
“necessary medicine.” 67 “All [the Act] means,” explained the court, “is
that the person must be actually sick, and, if the physician, after making
a reasonably full and fair investigation of the disease, believes in good
faith that his patient needed the whisky as a medical remedy, and prescribes it, he is not guilty of violating said section.” 68
Although this period preceded widespread reliance on health insurance to pay for medical care, a few other cases followed. Yet, none of the
early cases framed the notion of medical necessity as an operative concept for assessing healthcare claims. In 1920, a Texas court distinguished
“medically necessary” care from emergency care, concluding that medically necessary care to a child required parental consent, but emergency
care did not. 69 Thus, in 1920 in Texas, medical necessity could offer a
defense to the “offense” of performing an abortion. A year later, a Missouri court invoked the notion of medical necessity in a case involving
abortion. “The production of abortion,” wrote the court, is “the intent to
produce a miscarriage or abortion by administering drugs, using instru-

63

Minor, 11 S.W. at 473.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. (emphasis added).
68
Id.
69
Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1920) (distinguishing medically necessary care from emergency care).
64
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ments, etc., where the act is not a medical necessity. The intent constitutes the gravamen of the offense.” 70
Between the end of World War II and 1965, the year in which Congress established the Medicare and Medicaid programs, U.S. courts only
infrequently entertained the notion of medical necessity. Of those cases
that have been reported, a few involved tax issues 71 or questions about
the legitimacy of abortions. 72 Two reported cases, both decided in Massachusetts during this period, concerned questions about payments for
medical care. In one, a Boston hospital sought reimbursement for patient
care pursuant to a state law that made towns liable for the unpaid hospital expenses of residents “in need of public assistance” in the event that
hospitalization was medically necessary. 73 The determination of medical
necessity was to be made by the hospital itself.74 In the second case, a
Massachusetts court concluded that the Department of Public Welfare
did not owe a Boston hospital extra compensation for special nursing
care provided to four patients even if the department conceded the medical necessity of the care provided. 75 However payment decisions were
resolved, courts seemed simply to assume that providers determined
medical necessity.
Even near the end of this period, some courts seemed perplexed by
the notion that insurers should second-guess physicians’ medical determinations. Mount Sinai Hospital v. Zorek, decided by a New York trial
court in 1966, is illustrative. 76 The case involved a dispute about whether an insurer was obligated to pay for the hospitalization of Jane Zorek at
Mount Sinai Hospital, in 1963. The hospitalization was deemed neces70

State v. Keller, 229 S.W. 203 (Mo. 1921) (holding defendant was “improperly convicted” of carrying out an abortion on woman who died from the
effects); see also State ex rel. Gaston v. Shields, 130 S.W. 298 (Mo. 1910) (noting that intent to produce abortion was a felony unless it was a “medical necessity”); State v. De Groat, 168 S.W. 702 (Mo. 1914) (noting that legality of abortion procedure depended on whether it was medically necessary to preserve life
of pregnant woman).
71
See, e.g., Carasso v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 1139 (1960), aff’d, 292 F.2d 367
(2d Cir. 1961) (denying taxpayer right to deduct cost of living expenses for convalescent care away from home); Bilder v. Comm’r, 33 T.C. 155, 160 (1959),
vacated, 369 U.S. 499 (1961) (holding that petitioner’s housing expenses while
in Florida in the winter were “properly deductible medical expenses”).
72
See, e.g., State v. Miller, 261 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Mo. 1953) (act done with
intent to destroy fetus was manslaughter unless the “act was a medical necessity
to preserve the life of the woman or that of a ‘quick child’”).
73
Mass. Gen. Hosp. v. Revere, 191 N.E.2d 120, 121 (Mass. 1963).
74
Id. at 224–25.
75
Mass. Gen. Hosp. v. Comm’r of Pub. Welfare, 347 Mass. 24 (1964).
76
Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Zorek, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1014 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1966). Zorek was decided in the year following the promulgation of Medicare in
1965, but the events in question preceded the Medicare legislation’s passage.
See id.
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sary by Zorek’s physician in order to treat her obesity. While in the hospital, Zorek was placed on a zero-calorie diet, consisting only of fluids,
mixed with vitamins and minerals. 77 Although Zorek’s insurer – Blue
Cross – had paid for hospitalization for the same purpose in 1962, it refused to pay in 1963. 78 The Blue Cross contract 79 provided for hospital
coverage for a “condition” if the patient’s physician had concluded that
hospitalization was “necessary and consistent with the diagnosis and
treatment of the Condition for which hospitalization is required.” 80
The court in Zorek further explained that the insurer’s assertion that
it did not cover hospital care for obesity was misplaced insofar as the test
for coverage did not look to the patient’s diagnosis but to the necessity of
hospitalization for “proper treatment.” 81 Remarkably, in contrast with a
present-day perspective, the Zorek court noted the rarity of precedents
addressing questions about defining medical necessity:
The words “necessary for proper treatment” call into
play the exercise of judgment. “Proper” in whose eyes?
The patient’s, the treat[ing] physician’s, the hospital’s,
an [insurance] administrator, or a court’s looking back
on the events sometime afterwards? Although no cases
have been brought to the court’s attention directly dealing with this problem, this court concludes that the applicable standards of judgment as to the treatment prescribed must be those of the treating physician.82
In the court’s view, permitting insurers to refuse payment for care
recommended by an insured’s physician could serve no useful end:
Only the treating physician can determine what the appropriate treatment should be for any given condition.
Any other standard would involve intolerable secondguessing . . . The diagnosis and treatment of a patient are
matters peculiarly within the competence of the treating
physician . . . Can a hospitalization insurer rightfully decline to pay for the expenses incurred, on the theory that
subsequent events may have proved the diagnosis or the
recommended treatment to have been wrong?. . . Once

the treating doctor has decided on a course of

77

Id.
Id.
79
Jane Zorek’s Blue Cross coverage was through a policy with Associated
Hospital Service of New York. Id. at 1014–15.
80
Id. at 1015 (quoting patient’s Blue Cross policy).
81
Id. at 1016.
82
Id.
78
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treatment for which hospitalization is necessary, his
judgment cannot be retrospectively challenged. 83
In fact, the court did consider the reasonableness of Zorek’s physician having hospitalized her for treatment of obesity, and concluded that
the decision was within the parameters of sound medical care: “a busy
metropolitan hospital complex . . . was not going to make one of its
much sought-after-beds available for three weeks for a person who merely was seeking a ‘rest cure’. . . It was medical necessity and not cosmetic
vanity which dictated the hospital stay.” 84
Zorek reflects a healthcare world that has largely vanished. Now,
physicians’ recommendations are routinely questioned and overridden by
patients, insurers, and courts. And the certainty of the Zorek court’s conclusion that physicians’ decisions cannot be “retrospectively challenged”
by payers reminds one of a healthcare system that focused on physicians
and their patients in a universe before health care became big business.85
A decade after Zorek, assumptions that had defined health care for over a
century were being vociferously challenged, elided, and replaced.
In the set of cases considered in this subsection, all decided between
the late nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth century, no
one questioned the notion of medical necessity. The term was open to
flexible application, but it was assumed that those applications rested on
the notion of care deemed important for a patient’s health by his or her
clinician. Only later, after commercial and governmental mediators reshaped the character of medicine, did health insurers begin to include
“medical necessity” limitations in their contracts.86
B. Medicare
87

88

Congress created Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. The first
(promulgated as Title XVIII of the Social Security Act) provides coverage to almost all of those over 65 (as well as some others), and the second (promulgated as Title XIX of the Social Security Act) provides
coverage to certain low-income people. 89 Medicare is a federal program;

83

Id.
Id. at 1018.
85
This is not to suggest that that universe was without problems. Among
other things, patients were often given no choice about their medical care, and
medicine was able to do far less to treat a wide variety of conditions.
86
Hall & Anderson, supra note 50, at 1645–46.
87
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395b-10 (West 2014).
88
§§ 1396–1396w-5 (West 2014).
89
MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 1025 (8th ed.
2013).
84
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90
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program. This section focuses on the
development of Medicare and its consequences for visions of health care
in the United States. It has proved more consequential than Medicaid in
offering broad models for reforming the nation’s healthcare system. Further, Medicare has become a testing ground under the Affordable Care
Act for models of health care that may limit costs and sustain or improve
the quality of care. 91
The enormity of the Medicare program suggests the scope of its likely effects on the nation. In the decade following Medicare’s promulgation, expenditures for health care rose from $39 billion to $119 billion. 92
The program is now responsible for about twenty percent of spending for
health care in the United States. 93 In early 2014, Medicare expected its
contractors to handle approximately 1.2 billion claims submitted in its
fee-for-service program during the year. 94 At that time, the program covered about 50 million people at an estimated annual cost of almost $600
billion. 95

1. Passage of Medicare
In the years leading up to passage of the legislation that created
Medicare, physicians’ groups and hospitals voiced adamant opposition to
both Medicare and Medicaid. They saw these programs as a direct threat
90

This article focuses on changes relevant to Medicare, not Medicaid. Because the federal government alone runs Medicare, the program has a much
broader effect than Medicaid on the nation’s healthcare systems.
91
For instance, the option of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) created the Medicare Shared Savings Program to encourage Medicare providers,
working as part of integrated provider networks, to develop methods of limiting
spending while offering good care. 42 C.F.R. § 425.10–.20 (Medicare’s final
regulations for the ACO program). ACOs are paid set amounts for each patient
as well as incentive payments for meeting certain healthcare targets. Marc
Steinberg & Michealle Gady, Implementing Accountable Care Organizations,
FAMILIES USA: T HE VOICE FOR HEALTH C ARE CONSUMERS (Jan. 2012),
http://familiesusa.org/product/implementing-accountable-care-organizations.
Private insurers soon began to experiment with the ACO model of paying for
health care. Susan Adler Channick, Health Care Cost Containment: No Longer
an Option but a Mandate, 13 NEV. L.J. 792, 807 (2013).
92
Harvey V. Fineberg, Editorial, The State of Health in the United States,
310 JAMA 585, 585 (2013).
93
Bagley, supra note 46, at 554.
94
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-102, MEDICARE
PROGRAM INTEGRITY: GREATER PREPAYMENT CONTROL EFFORTS COULD
INCREASE SAVINGS AND BETTER ENSURE PROPER PAYMENT 6 (2012) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT]; Medicare Fraud Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony by Kathleen M. King, Health Care Director, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office) [hereinafter Testimony by Kathleen M. King].
95
Testimony by Kathleen M. King, supra note 94.
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to the medical profession, which had been largely free from governmental intrusion. 96 In the 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt had abandoned his support for a national program to provide healthcare coverage, in light of the
strength of physicians’ opposition. 97 And later, during the Truman administration, the AMA continued strenuously to oppose national
healthcare coverage, associating it, during the middle of the Cold War
years, with socialism. 98
In the effort to placate physicians and hospital groups, Congress
drafted the Medicare legislation to declare, “nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided.” 99 Congress designed Medicare on the model of the commercial insurance companies, with which
physicians and hospitals were familiar and comfortable. Even more, and
ultimately of still greater consequence, the legislation authorized insurance companies to render coverage determinations and to administer
Medicare payments. 100
In the years immediately following the creation of Medicare, the majority of hospitals in the nation relied on Blue Cross to administer hospital Medicare claims. 101 For purposes of administering Part B (the part of
Medicare relevant to clinician’s services), the nation was divided into 64
areas. 102 Contracts were given to forty-nine carriers, including Blue
103
Shield not-for-profit plans and a number of for-profit insurers.
This
design reflected a system with which clinicians and medical institutions
were familiar.
Despite these provisions, aimed at comforting physicians’ groups
and hospitals, by the 1970s, Medicare began openly to gainsay physi-

96

David Orentlicher, Rights to Healthcare in the United States: Inherently
Unstable, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 328 (2012).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395b-10 (West 2014).
100
Sylvia A. Law & Barry Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians’ Fees: Individual Patients or Society? (A Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
12–13 & n.67 (1986). The Medicaid statute gave states responsibility for developing a payment system for reimbursing physicians treating Medicaid patients.
Id. at 13 n.67.
101
Susan Bartlett Foote, The Impact of the Medicare Modernization Act’s
Contractor Reform on Fee-for-Service Medicare, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 67, nn.15–18 (2007).
102
Id. at nn.19–21.
103
Id. The number of fiscal intermediaries and carriers fell over time, leaving only 25 fiscal intermediary contractor organizations and 18 carrier contractor organizations by 2005. Id. at nn.22–24.
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104
cians’ decisions about medically necessary care. By the early 1980s,
Congress provided for Peer Review Organizations (PROs) to supervise
the kind and quality of care provided to Medicare patients. 105 PROs increased payer supervision over physician decision-making. 106 And threeand-a-half decades after the creation of Medicare, the Second Circuit –
even as it paid verbal homage to the significance of a treating physician’s
“informed opinion” 107 – expressly declared that a Medicare coverage
refusal could “not be set aside simply because it is at variance with the
joint assessment of the attending physician and the utilization review
committee at the hospital.” 108 It thus became clear that the model put in
place at Medicare’s start to administer the program’s claims and payments has had lasting consequences and has created significant challenges for the nation’s healthcare system.

2. Administration of Medicare Claims
This subsection reviews the model for reviewing claims that developed with the implementation of Medicare and considers some of its
more problematic features. Those reviewing and paying Medicare claims
were initially referred to either as “fiscal intermediaries” (those who reviewed hospital claims under Part A) or “carriers” (those who reviewed
providers’ claims under Part B). 109 In 2006 the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) renamed its claims and payment contractors,

104

Phyllis G. Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Independent Contracting Under Medicare and Implications for Expansion Into Managed Care, 16 J. LEGAL
MED. 509, 509 n.2 (1995).
105
Hall & Anderson, supra note 50, at 1651 (citing KAREN DAVIS ET AL.,
HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 104–29 (1990)).
106
Id. at 1652–53.
107
New York ex rel. Holland v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1991).
108
See id. The Secretary of Health and Human Services contended that
coverage was denied to the patient, Theresa Holland, because the in-patient care
provided to her was not “reasonable and necessary.” Id. at 58. The Utilization
Review Committee, an “in house” committee, acted, like others responsible for
reviewing Medicare claims, “on behalf of” the Secretary of Health and Human
Resources. See Michael Neeley-Kvarme, Administrative and Judicial Review of
Medicare Issues: A Guide Through the Maze, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 7–16
(1981). The Social Security Amendments of 1965 require hospitals receiving
Medicare funds to have utilization review committees. Pub. L. 89-97, § 102(a),
79 Stat. 286, 313 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see
also Eleanor D. Kinney, The Affordable Care Act and the Medicare Program:
The Engines of True Health Reform, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 253,
269 (2013).
109
HALL ET AL., supra note 89, at 1025; JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE
POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 111 (2003).
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Concalling them “Medicare Administrative Contractors” (MACs).
gress expected that this design – one putting insurers, and especially
Blue Cross and Blue Shield at the center of claims’ determinations – allowed hospitals and providers to work with groups with which they were
already comfortable. The plan openly gave private insurance companies
– some, such as the “Blues” were not-for-profits and others were forprofits – administrative control over “provider reimbursement, claims
processing, and auditing. 111 Significantly, until the last decade, the process of bidding to become a Medicare contractor was not competitive,112
and contractors’ pay did not reflect the quality of service rendered. 113
CMS’s contracts with intermediaries and carriers renewed automatically,
by their terms. 114
Under this system for determining claims, Medicare coverage determinations have suffered from inconsistency, in part because the system has not been monitored, the justification for individual determinations is rarely public and transparent, and, even in theory, many coverage
determinations hold no precedential value outside particular geographic
areas. 115
Since 2003, CMS has provided for both “national” and “local” coverage determinations. 116 National coverage determinations (NCDs) are
117
expected to pertain to Medicare participants
throughout the country
and to be used as precedents by Administrative Law Judges overseeing
claim appeals. 118 In contrast, local coverage determinations (LCDs) 119
110

MACs administer Medicare Parts A and B claims as well as durable
medical equipment claims. See GAO REPORT, supra note 97.
111
OBERLANDER, supra note 109, at 111; Foote, supra note 101, at 68. This
administrative structure gave a significant role to Blue Cross and Blue Shield,
because they controlled the largest part of the American health insurance industry when Medicare was implemented. OBERLANDER, supra note 109, at 111.
The “special status” of the Blues as “voluntary nonprofits made [them] an excellent fit for federal policymakers looking to alleviate concerns over federal
power by contracting out administration to the private sector.” Id. at 112.
112
Testimony by Kathleen M. King, supra note 94.
113
Id.
114
Patients First: A 21st Century Promise to Ensure Quality and Affordable
Care Health Coverage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 107th
Cong. (2001) (testimony of Michael F. Mangano, Acting Inspector Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.).
115
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., Local Coverage Determinations, in MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY
MANUAL § 13.1.2 (2014) [hereinafter INTEGRITY MANUAL], available at
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/
pim83c13.pdf.
116
Id. § 13.1.3.
117
GAO REPORT, supra note 94.
118
INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 115, § 13.1.1.
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assess the reasonableness of, and need for, particular services but apply
only within specific geographic regions. 120 Medicare contractors reaching LCDs are not required to – and often do not – inform providers about
the character and scope of interpretations relied on in processing particular claims. 121 This has built opacity into the center of the system. Now,
both local and national coverage determinations are reported in Medicare’s Coverage Database. 122 However, Medicare places the burden on
providers to review the database and expects that “health care providers
[will] know Medicare coverage requirements so that they can anticipate
payment denial”. 123
Only in 1986, did Congress establish any guidelines for national determinations. 124 And LCDs continue to result in different Medicare coverage policies in different geographic regions of the country. Further,
there has been no systematized effort to analyze the precedential value of
medical necessity determinations. 125 In part, that has been a product of
Congress’s broad grant of authority to Medicare contractors to determine
the legitimacy of charges for care without effective national guidelines. 126
a. Promises and Developments
The initial promise that Medicare would protect providers’ independence proved short-lived. Soon, contractors’ medical necessity determinations 127 began openly to disempower physicians. 128 And three

119

Id. § 13.1.3 (noting that the term “local coverage determinations” was
created by the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act).
120
GAO REPORT, supra note 94; INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 115, §
13.1.1. Before 2003, LCDs were also authorized to make decisions about benefit categories. See supra note 115, § 13.1.1.
121
Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare Medical Necessity Determinations Revisited: Abuse of Discretion and Abuse of Process in the War Against Medicare
Fraud and Abuse, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91 (1999).
122
How to Use the Medicare Coverage Database, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/
Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/
MedicareCvrgeDatabase_ICN901346.pdf.
123
Id.
124
Timothy P. Blanchard, “Medical Necessity” Determinations—A Continuing Healthcare Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH L. 599, 610 (2004) (citing Pub. L.
99-509, § 9321(e), 100 Stat. 1874, 2017 (1986)).
125
GAO REPORT, supra note 94.
126
See Blanchard, supra note 124, at 611. Congress did not define “reasonable” or “necessary” in the legislation providing that Medicare would pay for
“reasonable and necessary” care “for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or
injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (West 2014).
127
The term “contractor” is used to refer to “fiscal intermediaries,” “carriers,” and Medicare administrative contractors (MACs); however, use of the term
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decades after the language of the Medicare legislation appeared to leave
decisions about medical care to patients’ physicians, 129 the Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) asserted
openly that agency determinations should outweigh provider determinations. 130 That position – not always accorded deference in Medicare
claim appeals 131 – has contrasted with the “treating physician rule” that
132
pertains in disability cases within the Social Security Administration.
Even more, by the mid-1990s, hearings before the House Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations suggested
that often only a thin line separated physicians’ determinations of medical necessity from fraud. 133 Whatever the accuracy of that assess-

“administrative contractors” refers to MACs (the label that replaced the terms
fiscal intermediaries and carriers in 2006). See GAO REPORT, supra note 94.
128
Blanchard, supra note 124, at 604–07.
129
Bagley, supra note 46, at 526. Medicare’s “chief architect” Wilbur Cohen asserted that “[t]he sponsors of Medicare, including myself, had to concede
in 1965 that there would be no real controls over hospitals and physicians. I was
required to promise . . . that the Federal agency would exercise no control.” Id.
(quoting RICK MAYES & ROBERT A. BERENSON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT AND THE SHAPING OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 17 (2006)). Blanchard notes
that the statute itself states that “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed
to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are
provided.” Blanchard, supra note 124, at 605 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2004)).
130
Blanchard, supra note 124, at 605.
131
See State of New York on Behalf of Holland v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 57 (2d
Cir. 1991). The case involved a denial of Medicare coverage by HHS, and the
agency argued that in-patient care for Holland was not “reasonable and necessary.” Id. at 58. Holland’s doctor authorized care in a NYS rehabilitation hospital. The admission was approved by the admitting hospital’s Utilization Review
Committee. Id. HHS, an administrative law judge, and the Appeals Council refused to approve or order payment for Holland’s rehabilitation care on the
grounds that the admitting hospital should have been aware that Medicare
would not cover that care. Id. The district court agreed with the magistrate’s
recommendation that the medical care be covered, because the treating physician and the hospital’s Utilization Review Committee had approved the care in
question. Id. The Second Circuit remanded the case because neither the administrative law judge nor the Appeals Council offered any findings in the case. Id.
at 59–60.
132
Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Determination and Application of Correct
Legal Standard in Weighing Medical Opinion of Treating Source in Social Security Disability Cases, 149 A.L.R. FED. 1 (1998).
133
Screening Medicare Claims for Medical Necessity: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Res. & Intergovernmental Relations of the H. Comm. on
Gov’t Reform & Oversight, 104th Cong. 4 (1996) (statement of Sarah F. Jaggar,
Director, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office) [hereinafter Statement of Sarah F. Jaggar].
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134
it legitimizes skepticism about the good faith of physicians
ment,
submitting claims for payment. During 1990 House hearings, Sarah Jaggar, Director of the Health Financing and Policy Issues at the General
Accounting Office, focusing on how best to limit Medicare payments for
“unnecessary services,” 135 revealed significant suspicion of physicians’
claims and attributed overspending by Medicare to a “lack of financial
incentive for physicians or patients to resist unnecessary diagnostic tests
and routine services” within Medicare’s “fee-for-service” payment system. 136

b. Costs and Complexity
At least as problematic has been the uncertainty and enormity of
Medicare’s claims determination efforts. The process involves thousands
of people making determinations. Local coverage determinations – permissible in the absence of a relevant national coverage determination137
– have almost no precedential value and do not become public unless
appealed. 138 Appeals can be difficult to bring and are expensive for everyone. 139 Further, the scope Medicare has given to individual contractors
to reach coverage determinations at the local level has stymied development of a robust and effective national policy. 140
Decisions about healthcare coverage were – and in significant part
still are – grounded on a flexible, almost amorphous, understanding of
both “reasonable” and “necessary,” but particular determinations seemed
to leave no room for alternative approaches, such as partial coverage.
Many determinations – either approving or denying coverage – have
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Assessing the claim is an important task but one beyond the scope of this
Article.
135
Statement of Sarah F. Jaggar, supra note 133, at 4.
136
Id. at 8. Jaggar downplayed the notion that patients can act as watchdogs,
monitoring physicians’ tendency to over-treat patients, noting that patients often
lack the necessary knowledge to serve in that role. Id.
137
Medicare Coverage – General Information, CMS.GOV: CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/
CoverageGenInfo/index.html?redirect=/CoverageGenInfo/ (last modified Mar. 6,
2015, 1:15 PM).
138
Blanchard, supra note 124, at 609.
139
See id. at 609, n.43.
140
Timothy Blanchard noted: “The Medicare program continued to delegate
important coverage, documentation and coding rules to individual contractors
through the ‘local medical review policy’ (LMRP) process, despite what appeared to be the obvious benefits of national policymaking: efficiency, uniformity, and equity.” Id. at 612. After December 2003, all LMRPs “were converted to LCDs.” INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 118. Blanchard further
reported: “Providers and the Medicare regional offices develop LMRPs after a
notice and circulation of proposed policy for comment.” Blanchard, supra note
124, at 612–13.
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lacked nuance. Many claims have been approved or denied depending on
contractors’ individual views about the medical necessity of the care at
issue. 141 Ryan Abbott and Carl Stevens have suggested re-fashioning the
existing system on the model of a “variable co-pay approach” 142:
Validated, multilevel ratings of medical necessity based
on clinical circumstances for a majority of commonly
performed, costly diagnostic and therapeutic procedures
could be deployed in a variety of ways to ensure that patients who stand to benefit substantially retain access to
these procedures, while those who might benefit more
from alternative, less complex interventions are offered
both an opportunity and an incentive to select them . . . .
[A] woman desiring hysterectomy for bleeding prior to a
trial of conservative treatment would not be denied coverage based on a failure to meet a medical necessity
threshold. Instead, she might be offered the procedure
with a 30-40% co-pay prior to undergoing the surgery,
perhaps amounting to several thousand dollars. However,
the same patient, after failing an adequate trial of alternative non-operative treatments might receive the surgery with a low or even no co-pay, since the failure of
alternative therapy increases the appropriateness of a
surgical intervention. 143
The system for determining medical necessity should be restructured to
encourage decisions based around compromises. More generally, the
plethora of Medicaid contractors, the room given to contractors to reach
local determinations, and the complications and expense of appealing
Medicare determinations have resulted in uncoordinated, costly, replicated efforts that do not serve patients or providers as they should. 144
One study undertaken by the American Hospital Association (AHA)
in 2007 explored the consequences for hospital patients of the Medicare
system for reviewing claims. 145 The study looked only at denials of re141

Abbott & Stevens, supra note 12, at 6–7.
Id.
143
Id. at 17. Abbott and Stevens acknowledge the challenge of delineating
“multi-level medical necessity ratings” – called “Matrices of Appropriateness” –
for a wide variety of conditions in a manner that would avoid conflicts of interest. Id.
144
Jennifer E. Gladieux & Michael Basile, Jimmo and the Improvement
Standard: Implementing Medicare Coverage Through Regulations, Policy Manuals and Other Guidance, 40 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8–9, 24–25 (2014).
145
Limiting Access to Inpatient Medical Rehabilitation: A Look at Payment
Denials for Medicare Patients Treated in Inpatient Rehabilitation Facilities, AM.
HOSP. ASS’N
(Oct.
2007),
http://www.aha.org/content/00-10/071003
rehablcd.pdf [hereinafter Limiting Access].
142
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habilitation care submitted by seventy-two inpatient rehabilitation hospitals. 146 The AHA reported that Medicare’s fiscal intermediaries rejected
the vast majority of claims submitted for that care. 147 Eighty percent resulted in denials of coverage. 148 The consequences for hospital patients –
and ultimately for Medicare – were unfortunate:
Uncertainly about whether [claims] will be paid for care,
coupled with the high administrative costs associated
with increased payment denials and the lengthy appeals
process, has led many IRFs [inpatient rehabilitation facilities] to restrict the types of patients that they admit
for care, reduce clinical and support staff and decrease
the number of available beds. This reduces patient access to medical rehabilitation services, despite the fact
that these patients need this level of specialized care to
be able to return to everyday activities.149
Most of the denials rested on restrictive interpretations of Medicare’s
guidelines for rehabilitative care 150 or on policies reflecting local coverage determinations. 151 Both approaches create inconsistent responses to
claim submissions.
Determinations can be appealed, but as noted, the appeals process is
burdensome, costly, and time-consuming. 152 The process can involve
many stages and multiple reviewing platforms. Medicare appeals are
made to the responsible Medicare contractor (through a request for reconsideration); then appeals are taken, in this order, to a “qualified independent contractor;” an administrative law judge; a Medicare appeals
council; and a federal court. 153 The process, if followed only to level
three (a hearing before an administrative law judge) may take a year and
a half. 154 Relying on data collected from the first seven months of 2007
from 72 rehabilitation facilities in 20 states, the AHA researchers found
that 80% of claims submitted had been denied. 155 Importantly, by level
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Id. at 1.
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 3. The “Criteria for Medicare Coverage of Inpatient Rehabilitation” include, among other things: need for “intensive rehabilitation,” need for
physician and nurses specialized in rehabilitation, and expectation that rehabilitation will lead to “significant improvement in a reasonable period of time.” Id.
151
LCD policies are permissible, but Medicare rules preclude their use to
limit coverage for which Medicare’s Guidelines provide. Id.
152
Id. at 4.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 1.
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three of the appeals process – the stage of review managed by an administrative law judge – 63% of the appeals were successful. 156
In these cases, contractors’ medical necessity determinations were
often based on limited interpretations of Medicare guidelines and on idiosyncratic local considerations. 157 These determinations, many of which
were appealed, resulted in considerable expense for the facilities. Further,
some facilities were refusing to accept patients whom they believed were
eligible for in-hospital Medicare coverage but whose claims seemed
likely to be denied by Medicare contractors 158:
Uncertainly about whether [claims] will be paid for care,
coupled with the high administrative costs associated
with increased payment denials and the lengthy appeals
process, has led many IRFs [inpatient rehabilitation facilities] to restrict the types of patients that they admit
for care, reduce clinical and support staff and decrease
the number of available beds. This reduces patient access to medical rehabilitation services, despite the fact
that these patients need this level of specialized care to
be able to return to everyday activities. 159
Several years later (in 2014 and after passage of the Affordable Care
Act), the Office of Inspector General within HHS expressed concern that
LCDs result in inconsistencies among states regarding which items and
services Medicare covers. 160 A one-week study concluded in late 2011
showed that LCDs were generally not linked with “cost and utilization of
items and services.” 161 Accordingly, the Inspector General recommended
to CMS that Medicare Administrative Contractors create “a single set of
coverage policies.” 162
For years, Medicare has continued to rely on LCDs by many thousands of individual decision-makers whose assessments have not been
156

Id.
Id. at 4–8.
158
Id. at 7–8.
159
Id. at 1.
160
DANIEL R. LEVINSON, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., LOCAL
COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS CREATE INCONSISTENCY IN MEDICARE COVERAGE
(2014), available at http://njssahq.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LCDscreate-inconsistancy-in-Medicare-coverage-Jan2014.pdf.
161
Id. at 2.
162
Id. at 2. The Independent Payment Advisory Board will recommend
changes to some payment categories in the Medicare system. RICHARD S.
FOSTER, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
ESTIMATED FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT” (2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/downloads/PPACA_
2010-04-22.pdf.
157
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adequately guided by national policies: “The Medicare program continued to delegate important coverage and documentation and coding rules
to individual contractors through the ‘local medical review policy’
(LMRP) process, despite what appeared to be the obvious benefits of
national policymaking: efficiency, uniformity, and equity.” 163 (LMRPs
164
have since been replaced by LCDs.)
3. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003:
Some Changes in Approach
Congress has tried several times to reform Medicare with an eye toward sustaining or even improving quality while lowering costs. 165 None
of the reforms has been particularly effective – in significant part because none of the reform efforts upended the program’s dependence on
private organizations to administer and supervise Medicare claims and
payments. 166 Moreover, for decades, Congress did not respond to the
problems inherent in a claims processing system that depended on many
thousands of administrators, most affiliated with private insurance companies. Serious efforts to develop a national policy did not emerge until
the early twenty-first century. 167 Congress instituted some – though inadequate – changes in 2003 with the passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement, and Modernization Act (“Medicare Modernization Act”). 168 That law, known for creating Medicare Part D and
extending prescription drug benefits to seniors, also effected changes to
other parts of the Medicare program. 169
The Medicare Modernization Act replaced fiscal intermediaries (responsible for Part A determinations) and carriers (responsible for Part B
determinations) with a newly labeled category of contractors – the socalled Medicare Administrative Contractors. 170 Fiscal intermediaries and
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Blanchard, supra note 124, at 612.
INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 115.
165
Bagley, supra note 46, at 521.
166
Bagley, supra note 46, at 533–34.
167
See infra Subsection II.B.3.
168
See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003, Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 26
and 42 U.S.C.).
169
See id.
170
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. 108-173, § 911(a)(1), § 1874A, 117 Stat. 2066, 2378 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1395kk-1) [hereinafter Medicare Modernization Act]; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-417T, MEDICARE CONTRACTORS AND
PRIVATE PLANS PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN ADMINISTERING BENEFITS 4 (2014),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661317.pdf [hereinafter MEDICARE
CONTRACTORS].
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171

carriers are now referred to as “legacy contractors.” In addition, CMS
reduced the number of organizations responsible for hiring contractors
and broadened the geographical area within which groups of contractors
worked. 172 The Medicare Modernization Act also provided for a significant transformation in the selection process for organizations that would
enter into Medicare contractor agreements with the federal government.
For the first time, the process became competitive, with Medicare considering price, quality, and a number of other relevant factors, in selecting among companies bidding to serve as contractors. 173 Moreover, the
Act did away with restrictions on the type of contractors with which
CMS could enter into Medicare contractor agreements, and it provided
for payment of incentives linked to the quality of service. 174
In the same period, private insurers and Medicaid plans followed
Medicare’s model and developed procedures requiring prospective utilization review of care. 175 This approach significantly undermined the
power of patients and their individual physicians to choose among options for care. 176 These changes were exacerbated by protections that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) afforded to some
managed care organizations during the same decades.
C. Managed Care Organizations and Medical Necessity
Ironically, Medicare – fashioned so as to offer comfort to anxious
and disgruntled physicians and other healthcare providers – facilitated
the increasingly powerful hold of the commercial insurance industry on
coverage determinations.177 By the 1980s, the augmented control of the
industry facilitated developments in the structure of American health
care that altered traditional medicine dramatically. Further, Medicare’s
continuing efforts, despite consistent failure, to limit healthcare costs
resulted in models that were appropriated by private insurers, particularly in the context of the explosion of managed care organizations during
the last decades of the twentieth century. These organizations – especial171

Testimony by Kathleen M. King, supra note 94. Within a decade of the
passage of the Medicare Modernization Act, Medicare Administrative Contractors were handling virtually all claims-processing. LEVINSON, supra note 160, at
4; see also Foote, supra note 104, at 76 (reporting that very different aims inspired Medicare Advantage Preferred Provider Organization regions and “freestanding prescription drug plans . . . regions” and noting that the differences
could interfere with quality improvements).
172
MEDICARE CONTRACTORS, supra note 170, at 4.
173
Medicare Modernization Act, supra note 170.
174
Testimony by Kathleen M. King, supra note 94.
175
Hall & Anderson, supra note 50, at 1652–53.
176
See Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
177
By the start of the twenty-first century, following the development of the
managed care movement, insurance policies routinely specified that the insurer
controlled necessity determinations. Atwell, supra note 39, at 598.
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ly those with ERISA-protections – placed significant controls on the use
and costs of health care. 178
1. The Development of Managed Care Organizations
and ERISA Protection
Managed care first appeared in the United States after World War
I.
It did not emerge as an important mode of delivering health care
until the 1970s. That happened with passage of the Health Maintenance
Organization Act (FHMO Act). 180 The Act promoted managed care organizations by offering funding and other support to, as well as regulation of, groups that obtained certification pursuant to the law.181 The development of managed care organizations gained significant momentum
in the 1980s as a joint effort of insurers and employers to control the
costs of health care. 182 Managed care altered the physician-patient relationship, especially insofar as the development of managed care involved
the amalgamation of those paying for health care and those providing
health care. 183 In particular, managed care organizations (MCOs) – offering bundles of care at a pre-determined cost through provider networks 184 – compelled physicians to consider costs when making
healthcare decisions for patients.
ERISA, passed a year after the FHMO Act, effectively protected
self-insured employer health plans from state laws applicable to insurers. 185 ERISA has safeguarded these plans from state insurance laws and
from many suits by patients anxious to dispute denials of care to which
they believe they were entitled. 186 These results stem from ERISA’s
179

178

Eleanor D. Kinney, Resolving Consumer Grievances in a Managed Care
Environment, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 147, 148 (1996).
179
Benjamin Saunier, Note, The Devil Is in the Details: Managed Care and
the Unforeseen Costs of Utilization Review as a Cost Containment Mechanism,
35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 483, 489 (2010).
180
See 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1996). Various terms are used to refer to organizations called MCOs in this Article. For present purposes, the term health maintenance organization is synonymous with managed care organization.
181
See id.
182
Kinney, supra note 179, at 148, 150.
183
Id. at 152–53.
184
Brian Wilson, Tough Love: The Emergence of Criminal Statutes and
Disciplinary Actions Against Managed Care Plans for Inadequate Care, 18 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 53, 53 n.2 (2001) (quoting RAND ROSENBLATT
ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 551-52 (1997).
185
See § 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001b (noting that one goal of the Act was to safeguard the interests of people enrolled in “employee benefit plans”); Hirshfeld &
Thomason, supra note 7, at 42; Sharon Reece, The Circuitous Journey to the
Patients’ Bill of Rights: Winners and Losers, 65 ALB. L. REV. 17, 20 (2001).
186
§ 1144(a) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any
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preemption of state insurance laws relating to self-funded employer
group health plans. Such plans are subject only to federal law. Ironically,
however, ERISA resulted in a legal vacuum within which plans with
ERISA status could operate since neither the statute itself nor federal
common law offered any guidelines that might have replaced preempted
state laws. 187
Within a decade of ERISA’s passage, this legal vacuum encouraged
large employers to self-insure. 188 Rather than paying a health insurance
company to provide coverage for employees, employers funded their
own plans, hiring insurers to implement the plans and preserve ERISA’s
preemption protections from state laws. 189 Beginning in the 1980s and
continuing, unabated, through much of the 1990s, judicial interpretations
of ERISA granted disconcerting protection to managed care organizations with ERISA-status to operate outside state insurance laws. 190 By
the 1990s, health plans with ERISA-status covered approximately 44
million people in the United States. 191 ERISA freed these plans from a
significant part of state liability laws that applied to non-ERISA plans. 192

and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan . . .”); see also Wilson, supra note 185, at 53–55.
187
Timothy Cahill, Comment, Keeping the Saving Clause Safe from Judicial Annihilation: The Status of ERISA Preemption Jurisprudence Following
Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 611, 612 (2003).
188
Curtis D. Rooney, States, Congress, or the Courts: Who Will Be First to
Reform ERISA Remedies?, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 73, 74 (1998).
189
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 710 (7th ed. 2013) (noting that in addition to hiring plan administrators, employers typically buy stop-loss insurance policies). “[C]ourts have
overwhelmingly held that employer plans remain self-insured even though they
are reinsured through stop-loss plans, and have prohibited states from attempting to impose requirements on self-insured plans through regulation of stop-loss
coverage.” Id.
190
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S.
125 (1992) (strictly interpreting ERISA’s “relate to” language); Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (precluding insured from suing disability
insurer’s fiduciary for damages due to improper cancellation of coverage); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (providing for exemption of self-insured plans from state mandate that health insurers provide coverage for mental health); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)
(interpreting “relate to” language in ERISA statute literally).
191
Rooney, supra note 189, at 78 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
HEHS-95-167, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS AND
CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 9 (1995), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/230/221489.pdf).
192
Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care’s “Thirty Years
War”: The Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 283, 283–84 (2010).
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In consequence, plans gained enormous leeway to deny coverage requests. Thomas McLean and Edward Richards suggest the breadth of the
control that these cases gave to managed care organizations.
After Russell [decided in 1985], many assumed that
states could not individually regulate an ERISA MCO’s
prospective utilization review. Unfortunately, prospective utilization can be easily manipulated by creating incentives for physicians to misclassify a patient’s conditions so that expensive care is not classified as medically
necessary under the plan’s guidelines. Such incentives
became commonplace because MCOs are not required
to disclose provider incentive packages, and because
physicians had little power to bargain over these incentives once MCOs captured a majority of insured lives
where the physician practiced. 193
ERISA preemption has had particularly fateful consequences for patients facing coverage denials. Preemption of state law does not, of
course, preclude plaintiffs from moving cases to federal court. However,
ERISA provided no substantive law through which plaintiffs would have
been able to define their claims pursuant to federal laws. 194 Despite the
theoretical possibility of a federal common law that would have brought
justice to patients covered by plans with ERISA status, for over a century
before the passage of ERISA, the “business of insurance” was regulated
only at the state level. 195 As explained by one law professor, ERISA
preemption, compounded by the absence of relevant federal laws or rules,
lead to an untoward development:
The “void” or “absence of regulation” [created with
ERISA’s preemption provisions] was quickly filled by
corporate America, the ERISA Plans and the insurance
industry. Now, the rules are unilaterally written and implemented without any regulation. Plan documents are
drafted and amended without approval or supervision.
Extremely harsh provisions are implemented, leaving
the consumer without any input or protection. And the
federal courts are put into the position of being simple
enforcement tools of corporate policy. 196

193

Id. at 300.
See Meridith H. Bogart, Note, State Doctrines of Substantial Compliance: A Call for ERISA Preemption and Uniform Federal Common Law Doctrine, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 447, 449–52 (2003).
195
Roger M. Baron, “Consumer Protection” and ERISA, 56 S.D. L. REV.
405, 405–06 (2011) (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) for
conclusion that regulation of insurance was for the states).
196
Id. at 406.
194
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In some real part, during ERISA’s heyday for self-funded employer health coverage plans, reasonable understandings of medical
necessity fell victim to the interests that filled the vacuum created
by ERISA’s preemption of state laws – those of the commercial
players, especially large employers and the insurance companies
with which they entered into contracts to administer and protect
their self-funded plans. 197
a. Corcoran v. United Healthcare
A case decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1992 illustrates the potentially
dire consequences for patients receiving healthcare coverage through a
self-funded employer plan protected by ERISA’s preemptions clauses.198
The case, Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 199 was commenced by Florence Corcoran, who worked for South Central Bell Telephone Company
and received healthcare coverage through the employer’s self-funded
plan. The plan was administered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama. Part of the plan (known as the “Quality Care Program”) was administered by UnitedHealth Care (“United”). 200 In 1989, Corcoran be201
came pregnant. Because the pregnancy was high-risk, her obstetrician
recommended hospitalization as the pregnancy approached its due
date. 202 The part of Corcoran’s plan known as the Quality Care Program
required pre-certification from United for hospital stays and for certain
medical procedures. 203 Florence Corcoran’s physician sought precertification for the hospital stay he thought necessary for the success of
Corcoran’s pregnancy. The plan’s definition of the Quality Care Program
suggests a level of troubling opacity – almost subterfuge:
The Quality Care Program (QCP) administered by United HealthCare, Inc., assists you and your covered dependents in securing quality medical care according to
the provisions of the Plan while helping reduce risk and
expense due to unnecessary hospitalization and surgery.
They do this by providing you with information which
will permit you (in consultation with your doctor) to
evaluate alternatives to surgery and hospitalization when
those alternatives are medically appropriate. In addition,
197

Id.
Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
199
Id. at 1321.
200
Id. at 1323. The self-funded plan was administered, in the main, by Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama. Part of the plan was administered by United
HealthCare.
201
Id. at 1322.
202
Id. at 1322–23.
203
Id. at 1323.
198
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QCP will monitor any certified hospital confinement to
keep you informed as to whether or not the stay is covered by the Plan. 204
The language is striking in suggesting the plans commitment to patient
care and its significant value to the covered employee: it “assists [the
employee] and [his or her] dependents” in receiving “quality care.” At
the same time it “reduce[s] risk and expense due to unnecessary hospitalization and surgery.” More remarkable still, the plan summary advised
the insured that “when reading [the] booklet,” he or she should “remember that all decisions regarding your medical care are up to you and your
doctor.” 205 In theory, that was the case. In fact, it was not.
United denied the request of Corcoran’s obstetrician for in-hospital
care. Instead, it provided nursing care to Corcoran at home for 10-hours
each day. During a period when no nurse was present, Corcoran’s fetus
suffered distress and died. 206 Florence Corcoran and her husband Wayne
sued in a Louisiana state court, seeking compensation for the “wrongful
death” of the fetus. 207 The defendants relied on ERISA to move the case
to federal court. 208
The plan’s language masked the truth. Among other things, only
very wealthy patients could have afforded the sort of care Corcoran
needed. 209 As with Corcoran, almost all patients in Corcoran’s situation
would have been compelled to accept alternative modes of care in light
of the insurer’s denial. Most of the language quoted above from the
plan’s summary must be characterized as a “public relations” stunt rather
than a straightforward description of a healthcare plan – as Corcoran’s
case shows.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed: 210
Ultimately, we conclude that United makes medical decisions – indeed, United gives medical advice – but it
does so in the context of making a determination about
the availability of benefits under the plan. Accordingly,
we hold that the Louisiana tort action asserted by the
204

Id.
Id.
206
Id. at 1324.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 1324–25.
209
The plan summary further explained: “United Health Care, an independent professional medical review organization, has been engaged to provide services under QCP. United's staff includes doctors, nurses, and other medical professionals knowledgeable about the health care delivery system. Together with
your doctor, they work to assure that you and your covered family members
receive the most appropriate medical care.” Id. at 1324.
210
Id. at 1331.
205
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Corcorans for the wrongful death of their child allegedly
resulting from United's erroneous medical decision is
pre-empted by ERISA. 211
b. Corcoran’s Protection
In effect, the breadth of the protection afforded to insurers in cases
such as Corcoran placed benefit denials for health plans governed by
ERISA outside the purview of state review. The court lamented aspects
of its decision, while re-affirming that the law gave it no choice: 212
The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the
Corcorans have no remedy, state or federal, for what
may have been a serious mistake. This is troubling for
several reasons. First, it eliminates an important check
on the thousands of medical decisions routinely made in
the burgeoning utilization review system. With liability
rules generally inapplicable, there is theoretically less
deterrence of substandard medical decision-making.
Moreover, if the cost of compliance with a standard of
care (reflected either in the cost of prevention or the cost
of paying judgments) need not be factored into utilization review companies’ cost of doing business, bad medical judgments will end up being cost-free to the plans
that rely on these companies to contain medical costs. 20
ERISA plans, in turn, will have one less incentive to
seek out the companies that can deliver both high quality services and reasonable prices. 213
Corcoran made it clear 214 that utilization reviews before the provision of health care provided a powerful mechanism for limiting costs –
but one that could easily elide concern for good care. Medical necessity
determinations were at the center of these utilization reviews, suggesting
forcefully how easily the notion of medical necessity can be twisted to
serve a wide variety of financial (as well as political or ideological) interests. The pre-certification process interfered in new ways – both qualitative and quantitative – with the physician-patient relationship.215 Denials resulting from prospective and concurrent utilization reviews
precluded care that physicians had recommended. 216
211
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Id. at 1338.
213
Id.
214
See supra notes 204–219 and accompanying text.
215
Linda V. Tiano, The Legal Implications of HMO Cost Containment
Measures, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 79 (1990).
216
See Sarchett v. Blue Shield of Cal., 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987) (en banc);
Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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For several decades, ERISA offered significant protection to insurers
denying prospective and concurrent claims. 217 The level of protection
that Corcoran extended to health plans governed by ERISA seemed to
free such plans from the need to buy malpractice insurance, thus offering
an additional financial advantage to industry at the expense of patients. 218 At least some ERISA-governed plans may actually have denied
coverage to patients that they would have provided had they not enjoyed
apparent protection from liability for malpractice. 219
2. Shifts in ERISA Jurisprudence
Under the reign of pro-industry ERISA cases in the 1980s and 1990s,
medical necessity determinations became an integral part of a world of
managed care that aimed – though rarely explicitly – to ration care.220
The American public has remained adamant about rejecting healthcare
rationing. But all insurers – and managed care organizations, in particular – have relied on medical necessity determinations to cut costs. 221 The
loss to good health care and the cost in appealed denials has been significant. 222 Despite this, the insurance industry’s attempts to limit expenditures for health care gained increasingly broad protection in the last decades of the twentieth century as courts consistently broadened the
protection given to employer-funded plans administered by insurers.223
Managed care plans developed in the 1980s and 1990s did limit expens-
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The history of judicial interpretations of ERISA is beyond the scope of
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Note, ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims in Managed Care:
Asserting a New Statutory Interpretation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1131 (1999); Donald
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McLean & Richards, supra note 193, at 302.
219
Id.
220
Frances H. Miller, Denial of Health Care and Informed Consent in English and American Law, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 46 (1992).
221
Kristen Underhill, Paying for Prevention: Challenges to Health Insurance Coverage for Biomedical HIV Prevention in the United States, 38 AM. J.L.
& MED. 607, 647–48 (2012).
222
Id.
223
See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982) (limiting understanding of “insurance,” resulting in wider ERISA preemption);
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (extending preemption to insurers’ decisions about payment amounts).
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224
es, but too often they sacrificed good health care in order to do that. In
short, managed care companies often seemed focused on money making
at the expense of both patients and their doctors, an approach that placed
significant limitations on healthcare choices. 225
The consequences of the increasingly obvious capacity of selffunded plans to elide liability for negligent claim denials, as well as to
avoid state insurance laws, led eventually to rejection of managed care in
the private markets, despite its initial successes in cutting healthcare expenditures. Managed care’s limitations for patient care, and thus for patients’ health, simply became too evident, too often. Increasingly, the
public perceived managed care as a form of healthcare rationing. 226 At
first, managed care worked to disguise its capacity to, and interest in,
rationing health care. 227 Soon, the reality appeared beneath the mask.
Professor David Orentlicher relied on explanations outlined in Tragic
Choices by Guido Calabresi and Phillip Bobbit to describe this process 228:

Calabresi and Bobbitt explain that the difficult life-anddeath choices entailed in rationing can only be made by
hiding them from public scrutiny. Managed care provided a method for disguising rationing. However, write
Calabresi and Bobbitt, when the hidden “tragic choices”
are exposed – as they ultimately will be – the method for
making those choices becomes discredited, and the public demands a new method. 229
By the end of the twentieth century, this pattern emerged with regard to
managed care’s excesses. 230 The harsh impact of ERISA on patients denied coverage – and thus, in effect, denied care – and on patients seeking
compensation for inappropriate denials of care has eased. 231 In 1995, the
Court recognized the excesses that flowed from its ERISA cases. In that
year, it began to re-shape and limit its conclusions about ERISA’s power
to preempt state laws. 232

224

See supra notes 184–189 and accompanying text.
Abbott & Stevens, supra note 12.
226
Orentlicher, supra note 96, at 411–12.
227
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
228
Id.
229
Orentlicher, supra note 96, at 413.
230
See supra Section II.C.2.
231
Some changes in interpretations of ERISA’s preemption appeared as early as the mid-1990s. See, e.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (preserving a state law
imposing a hospital surcharge tax from ERISA preemption).
232
Id. (concluding that state law relating to hospital fees was not preempted
by ERISA); Bogart, supra note 195, at 462–66.
225
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Still, the consequences of Congress’s decision, in crafting the Medicare legislation, to place medical necessity determinations in the hands
of the insurance industry are felt widely. At its worst, that model undermines coverage decisions – with regard both to payments and care – that
might better serve the health of the nation. And still self-funded plans
enjoy some protection from ERISA status, and managed care plans, generally, have recently gained greater support from the federal government.
Both Medicare 233 and Medicaid 234 now offer managed care options,
and the Affordable Care Act 235 encourages the development of comparable structures. Fortunately, there has been some retreat from the period
(in the late twentieth century) during which managed care organizations
protected by ERISA rendered medical necessity determinations with apparent impunity, even in cases in which those determinations seemed
unconnected to virtually any understanding of “medical necessity.” In
large part, increasing public furor, roused by images of federal law protecting managed care organizations but not patients, and of managed
care organizations as giant commercial enterprises ready to kill patients
for another dollar, stimulated fledgling legal changes that now brake
ERISA’s peculiar and fierce protection for self-funded employer health
plans. 236 Unfortunately the Affordable Care Act has left most of ERISA’s
most troubling provisions intact. 237
D. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
and Medical Necessity
The Affordable Care Act does, however, effect a large number of
changes relevant to employer-provided coverage. In contrast with
ERISA, which applies only to plans that have, in fact, developed health
care coverage plans for employees (with no requirement that employers
do so), the Affordable Care Act gives large employers a choice between
providing healthcare coverage or paying a penalty if any uninsured employee uses premium tax credits to help pay for coverage through a state
233

Drew Altman, Pulling it Together: Duals: The National Health Reform
Experiment We Should Be Talking More About, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jun. 1,
2012),
http://www.kff.org/pullingittogether/dual-eligibles-health-reform.cfm;
see also Carolyn J. McElroy, State Perspective on Health Care EnforcementMedicaid Fraud Control Units, SE34 ALI-ABA 493 (1999).
234
By the end of the twentieth century, Medicaid was relying more and
more often on managed care organizations. See, e.g., Robert N. Swidler, Special
Needs Plans: Adapting Medicaid Managed Care for Persons with Serious Mental Illness or HIV/AIDS, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1998).
235
See Christopher Smith, It’s A Mistake: Insurer Cost Cutting, Insurer Liability, and the Lack of ERISA Preemption Within the Individual Exchanges, 62
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 75, 96–99 (2014) (noting likely expansion of managed care
under Affordable Care Act).
236
Wilson, supra note 185, at 53–55; McLean & Richards, supra note 193.
237
FURROW ET AL., supra note 190, at 713.
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238
exchange. Moreover, under the Affordable Care Act, healthcare plans,
including ERISA plans, must provide binding external review of coverage denials. 239 This will usually result in requiring group health coverage plans to follow the requirements set by states’ external review
rules. 240
The Affordable Care Act became law in 2010. 241 Most of its essential provisions have been implemented. It has extended access to
healthcare coverage in the United States. 242 However, the Affordable
Care Act focuses on limiting the cost of healthcare insurance far more
than on limiting the cost of health care. 243 Further, the nation continues
244
to face larger per capita healthcare costs than any other nation. And
most of the act’s provisions that facilitate programs aimed at reducing
the costs of health care only involve Medicare. 245 Even more concerning,
the Act both re-enforces the nation’s dependence on private healthcare
insurers, and it fails to facilitate reductions in the price of pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and other expensive healthcare resources. 246
More particularly, the Affordable Care Act has expanded on Medicare’s institutionalization of the role of insurers in paying for care and
has reinforced the assumption that insurers should participate actively in
medical necessity determinations. 247 That assumption, along with concern about its implications, is reflected in a letter sent to then-HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius in April 2012 by over 100 organizations representing people with chronic conditions and disabilities. 248 The letter,

238

FURROW ET AL., supra note 190, at 739.
Id. at 743 (citing Affordable Care Act, supra note 26, § 2719).
240
Id. at 713.
241
Affordable Care Act, supra note 26.
242
Carolyn O’Hara, An Obama Expert Tells All: What You Need to Know
About the Affordable Care Act, FORBES (Oct. 11, 2013, 2:45 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2013/10/11/an-obamacare-expert-tellsall-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-affordable-care-act.com (noting that the
Act extends coverage opportunities but does not guarantee access to care).
243
Id.
244
Maxwell S. Thomas, Note, A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Health Care
Models—Lessons Learned on the Importance of Localized Preventative Care in
Reducing Chronic Disease, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 443, 443–44 (2013) (reporting
that in 2012 the United States spent more than two times as much as “other
‘rich’ countries” on health care).
245
Mark A. Hall, Address, Evaluating the Affordable Care Act: The Eye of
the Beholder, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1029, 1042 (2014) (noting that the act has virtually no provisions aimed at cutting the cost of private health insurance, and the
provisions aimed at “provider payment reform” concern Medicare only).
246
Id. at 1040.
247
Skinner, supra note 35, at 2.
248
Letter from Adult Congenital Heart Ass’n et al., to The Honorable Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., (Apr. 11, 2012)
239
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urging changes in proposed standards for Essential Health Benefits
(EHBs) 249 and prescription drug coverage, urges that HHS clearly delineate standards for medical necessity determinations 250:
Plans must use medical necessity criteria that are objective, clinically valid, and compatible with generally accepted principles of care. A health intervention should
be covered if it is an otherwise covered category of service . . . recommended by the treating health care professional recognized under state or federal law, and determined by the health plan’s medical director to be
medically necessary. 251
In addition to cementing the role of the insurance industry in shaping
U.S. health care for the foreseeable future,252 the Affordable Care Act
contains specific provisions that limit the authority of HHS to interfere
with insurers’ coverage decisions. Importantly, the Act expressly provides for the continued use of utilization reviews by insurers. 253 And it
recognizes and approves of extant methods of carrying out those reviews. 254 This significantly limits the ability of HHS to interpret the parameters of the “essential benefits” that many insurers, including those

[hereinafter Letter to Sebelius], available at http://www.accc-cancer.org/
advocacy/pdf/2012-EHB-Groupletter.pdf (urging HHS to reconsider proposed
standard requiring EHB plans to “only cover one drug per therapeutic category
or class covered by a selected state benchmark plan”). The letter was signed by
104 organizations “on behalf of the more than 133 million Americans living
with chronic diseases and disabilities and their caregivers.” Id.
249
Section 1302 of the Affordable Care Act notes ten essential benefits that
insurers offering plans to the individual market or the small group market must
include. Affordable Care Act, supra note 26. Prescription drug benefits are included among those ten essential benefits. Id.
250
Letter to Sebelius, supra note 249.
251
Id. The letter further urges that denials must be adequately explained to
patients and that patients must be informed about the opportunity to appeal negative determinations.
252
See Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Social and Legal Debate
About the Affordable Care Act, 80 UMKC L. REV. 45, 54–55 (2011).
253
Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum, & Katherine Hayes, The Essential
Health Benefits Provisions of the Affordable Care Act: Implications for People
with Disabilities, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 3 (Mar. 2011),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issuebrief/2011/mar/1485_rosenbaum_essential_hlt_benefits_provisions_aca_disabili
ties_reform_brief_v2.pdf (noting as well that the Act does not define “utilization
review”).
254
Id. at 3, 5. Extant utilization review methods cannot, however, survive if
they violate the nondiscrimination provisions of the Affordable Care Act. Id. at
13.
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offering policies on the state exchanges, must include in their plans.
Further, the agency largely relieved itself of the burden – or opportunity,
depending on one’s perspective – of hammering out the specific details
of the ten categories of essential benefits that must be included in plans
offered to the individual or small group market by transferring much of
that task to the states. 256 Still, decisions must be made continuously
about what services are deemed medically necessary and thus eligible for
coverage. The Affordable Care Act offers no definition of medical necessity and does not explain how to distinguish between medical interventions and non-medical interventions.257
In short, the Affordable Care Act leaves medical necessity determinations to private insurers and will have little effect on the manner in
which those determinations are rendered. 258 The Act forfeited an opportunity to limit the role of the insurance industry in reaching medical necessity determinations for government plans such as Medicare and Medicaid and for the state exchanges. That was perhaps an inevitable
consequence of the Act’s broader design – one that placed the insurance
industry at the center of the system constructed for offering coverage
through state exchanges. 259
At least in theory, insurers’ medical necessity determinations in plans
offered pursuant to the Affordable Care Act must abide by statutory limits, but, in fact, the Affordable Care Act delineates very few limits that
might constrain such decisions. 260 Thus, in this crucial regard – albeit
one not often the focus of critique – the Obama administration buttressed
the pre-existing system by which insurers made decisions about coverage. 261 The Act does provide for external independent reviews of medi-

255

See Letter to Sebelius, supra note 249 (noting delineation of essential
health benefits in § 1302 of the Affordable Care Act).
256
CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, Essential Health Benefits Bulletin, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 1, 8 (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/essential_health_benefi
ts_bulletin.pdf (proposing that essential health benefits be defined “by a benchmark plan selected by each state”).
257
INST. OF MED., supra note 10, at xi, 75, 95; Hill, supra note 52, at 450.
258
Hill, supra note 52, at 461. The term “medical necessity” (or “medically
necessary”) appears only three times in the Act (§§ 2707, 520K, and 9007). See
Daniel Skinner, Defining Medical Necessity Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REV. S49, S50 (2013). None of these sections defines the term(s).
259
The so-called “individual mandate”—made necessary to protect the insurance industry from provisions in the act—required insurers to, among other
things, cover everyone eligible for coverage under the Act without regard for
pre-existing conditions, and required people to have healthcare coverage or pay
a penalty-tax. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
260
Hill, supra note 52, at 465.
261
Id. at 466.
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262

cal necessity determinations that are appealed, and that is important.
But it is not enough.
Of additional significance, the Affordable Care Act fails to provide
for the development of national guidelines in light of which medical necessity determinations could be effected and assessed. Even though definitions of medical necessity are less crucial than the identity of those
reaching medical necessity determinations, the absence of national
guidelines defers to an already empowered industry. In this light, it is
troubling that an IOM committee, responding to a request from the Secretary of HHS to define medical necessity, disfavored development of
national standards. 263 The committee concluded that a call for transparency in the definition of medical necessity in plans required to offer the
10 essential health benefits along with the opportunity for external reviews of medical necessity determinations offered adequate protection. 264 And the report recommended that distinctions between medical
and non-medical interventions be left to industry. 265 Further, the IOM
committee noted concern that medical necessity determinations can support discriminatory motives but concluded that the Act offered adequate
protection to vulnerable populations:
Evaluations of medical necessity will have to comply
with inclusion of the 10 categories of care as well as
prohibitions against discrimination based on age, disability, and expected length of life in the ACA and secretarial guidance. As noted in testimony to the committee
with regard to potential discrimination in the application
of medical necessity to persons with disabilities, “The
central question is whether the treatment is medical in
nature and whether the individual can be expected to
medically benefit from it.” 266
In sum, the IOM report supported, and therein legitimized anew, the
system that for a half-century has granted control of medical necessity
262

John K. Iglehart, Defining Essential Health Benefits—The View from the
IOM Committee, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1461, 1463 (2011).
263
INST. OF MED., supra note 10. The report further considered, in response
to then Secretary Sebelius’s request, more carefully defining the ten essential
health benefits delineated in the Affordable Care Act. Id. at 96.
264
Id. at 99. The IOM further recommended that HHS interpret the “medical purpose of interventions” so as adequately to affect the ten essential
healthcare benefits defined in the Affordable Care Act and that it see medical
necessity in light of “clinically appropriate” care for individual patients “based
on the best scientific evidence,” and most “likely to produce incremental health
benefits relative to the next best alternative that justify any added cost.” Id.
265
Id. at 75.
266
Id. at 98 (citing CHERYL ULMER ET AL., INST. OF MED., PERSPECTIVES ON
ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: WORKSHIP REPORT (2012)).
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decisions to the insurance industry. The implications of its suggestion –
followed by the administration in its implementation of the Affordable
Care Act – are worrisome:
[T]he IOM report noted the multiple existing definitions
of “medical necessity.” Again dispensing with the necessity of fixing one particular definition for the term, the
IOM report embraced the view that “[t]he central question is whether the treatment is medical in nature and
whether the individual can be expected to medically
benefit from it” – thus referring back to the very term
(“medical”) that it had earlier declined to define. The report essentially deferred the task to private insurers, who
have substantial experience in defining medical necessity, while emphasizing the values of “individualizing care,
ensuring value, and having medical necessity decisions
strongly rooted in evidence.” 267
Importantly, the Affordable Care Act grants the right to de novo external review of claim denials; the Act does not echo that protection with
regard to categorical denials of coverage.268 This may impact interpretations of the ten essential benefits mandated under the Act for insurers
providing coverage for the individual and small-group markets. 269 And it
may result in denials of healthcare coverage to patients who are not assured the right – given to those challenging individual, medical necessity
determinations – to de novo external review. 270
E. Who Has Benefitted?
The power granted to the insurance industry by Medicare – a power
reinforced through the Affordable Care Act – is of little, if any, value to
patients and prospective patients. Industry benefits, but patients and their
clinicians do not. This Section reviews the role of industry in making
medical necessity determinations and suggests some of benefits that accrue to industry as a result.
267

Hill, supra note 52, 450–51.
In Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999),
the Tenth Circuit upheld a decision for the plan on the grounds that the eligibility terms were part of the plan even though they were unpublished. This response is particularly hard on parties appealing coverage denials. The court explained that the denial of coverage by the Plan Administrator was acceptable
because the patient denied coverage “presented no evidence that the criteria
were applied in a discriminatory manner in her case.” Id. at 1292.
269
See Letter to Sebelius, supra note 249 (noting delineation of essential
health benefits in § 1302 of the Affordable Care Act).
270
See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 254, at 6 (noting differences between
denials grounded on “benefit and coverage design” and those based on utilization reviews).
268
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1. The Role of the Insurance Industry
Medicare, by providing for third-party contractors to administer
claims, erected a framework within which the nation’s healthcare system
271
has operated since its passage.
Especially in the last decades of the
twentieth century, ERISA expanded protections for self-funded managed
care plans in troubling fashion. 272 That development augmented the risks
of reliance on insurance companies to make medical necessity decisions
for private and government healthcare plans.
At the end of the last century, Congress entertained a provision, part
of the Patients’ Bill of Rights Act of 1998, that would have returned authority for medical necessity determinations to physicians. 273 The bill, if
enacted as law, would have broadly provided for patients’ rights and regulated health maintenance organizations. 274 The insurance industry opposed the bill in general and Section 151 in particular. 275 That section
provided that healthcare insurers could not “arbitrarily interfere with or
alter the decision of the treating physician regarding the manner or setting with which particular services are delivered if the services are medically necessary or appropriate for treatment or diagnosis to the extent
that such treatment or diagnosis is otherwise a covered benefit.” 276 The
Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), in adamant opposition
to the bill and to Section 151, in particular, opined that the provision
would “undermine utilization management and increase costs,” “encourage fraud and abuse, especially by providers,” “undermine quality and
perhaps even expose patients to danger,” “undermine contract law,”
“create a unique coverage regime for private insurance inconsistent with
governmentally funded programs,” 277 and would destroy the nation’s
278
healthcare system as a consequence of physician greed.
Further, some insurance company contracts expressly gainsay the assumption that physicians’ medical decisions comply with insurers’ con-

271

See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.C.
273
Patients’ Bill of Rights Act of 1998, S. 2529, 105th Congress § 151(a)(1)
(1998). The bill, sponsored by Senator Thomas A. Daschle (D-SD), did not pass.
See id., 105 Bill Tracking Report S. 2529 (Lexis 1998).
274
See S. 2529.
275
Robert Pear, Senators Reject Bill to Regulate Care by H.M.O.’s, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at A1. The bill was opposed by the insurance industry and
displaced by the Clinton-Lewinsky sex scandal that plagued President Clinton’s
administration. Id.
276
S. 2529 § 151(a)(1).
277
“Medical Necessity” and Health Plan Contracts, HIAA,
http://lobby.la.psu.edu/001_Managed_Care_Reform/Organizational_Statements/
HIAA/HIAA_Medical_Necessity_and_Health_Plan_Contracts.htm (last visited
May 20, 2015).
278
Id. (referring to instances of provider fraud, greed, and overreaching).
272

2015]

Controlling “Medical Necessity”

479

279
Holl v. Amalgamated
tractual understandings of medical necessity.
Sugar Company involved a Blue Cross policy that provided that “the fact
a Covered Provider may prescribe, order or recommend a service does
not determine Medical Necessity.” 280 Federal Magistrate Judge Candy
Dale acknowledged a conflict for an insurer acting as “both the administrator and funding source” for a plan:

[W]hile the administrator is responsible for administering the plan so that those who deserve benefits receive
them, the administrator also “has an incentive to pay as
little in benefits as possible to plan participants because
the less money the insurer pays out, the more money it
retains in its own coffers.” 281
Yet, Judge Dale held for the ERISA-protected defendant, the plaintiff’s
employer, and administrator of the company’s Blue Cross healthcare
plan. 282 The court concluded that the plan’s denial of the plaintiff’s claim
(for IviG infusion therapy to treat myasthenia gravis) had not violated
the plaintiff’s right to coverage under the policy. 283
2. Benefits to Industry
From the passage of Medicare in 1965 through the passage of the
Affordable Care Act in 2010, Congress supported granting the health
insurance industry a key role in the operation of the nation’s healthcare
system. 284 The industry has flourished. 285 In 2013, the healthcare insurance industry enjoyed robust earnings and saw large increases in the
price of its stock. 286 That success followed passage of the Affordable
Care Act (implemented in large part by early 2014). The centrality that
the Act gives to the insurance industry in reshaping the nation’s
279

Holl v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., No. 1:13-cv-00231-CWD, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 59257 (D. Idaho 2014).
280
Id.
281
Id. at n.6 (citing Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 986
(9th Cir. 2006)).
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
See supra notes 254, 259 and accompanying text.
285
See infra notes 296–308 and accompanying text.
286
Health Insurance CEO Pay Sky-Rockets in 2013: Some See Their Compensation Double, PR NEWSWIRE (May 5, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/health-insurance-ceo-pay-sky-rockets-in-2013-257974651.html
[hereinafter Health Insurance CEO Pay] (noting that some of the Fortune 500
Health Insurance companies reported “better-than-expected earnings in the first
quarter of 2014”); see also Tom Murphy, Insurers Aetna, WellPoint Bulk Up
TODAY
(Apr.
2,
2014,
1:47
PM),
Executive
Pay,
STL
http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/insurers-aetna-wellpoint-bulk-upexecutive-pay/article_54143648-0b8d-5028-bdf4-f7404234bfe9.html.
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healthcare system institutionalized and, thus, strengthened a system put
in place almost a half-century earlier. 287
a. The Insurance Industry
For instance, Aetna’s 2013 Annual Report noted an increase in “fees
and other revenue” compared with the previous year of $689 million; in
2012, the company reported increased “fees and other revenue” as compared with 2011 of $132 million. 288 Aetna’s “annual operating revenue”
in 2013 was $47.2 billion, a 33 percent increase from 2012. 289 In the
same years, UnitedHealth Group reported 2013 revenues of about $122
billion and of about $110 billion in 2012. 290
For the industry’s CEOs, 2013 also proved to be a boon year. The
compensation of Fortune 500 health insurance company CEOs rose by
almost one-fifth. 291 Compensation for Aetna’s CEO was $30 million in
2013, and WellPoint’s CEO received $17 million. 292 During the same
period – with an average annual compensation for CEO’s of Fortune 500
health insurance companies of over $11 million – Medicare paid its top
administrator less than $200,000. 293 One commentator, noting this remarkable difference, commented:
“The culture of excess at these for-profit corporations is
incompatible with the goals of an efficient, ethical health
care system, where every dollar diverted from patient
care represents a loss of access for real families . . . We
face the highest healthcare costs and have among the
worst health outcomes of any country in the developed
world because we allow private health insurers and dozens of other intermediaries to act as for-profit middlemen in the health care system. Although many backers
of the Affordable Care Act said it would rein in insur-

287

See supra Section II.B and Section II.D.
AETNA, 2013 AETNA ANNUAL REPORT: FINANCIAL REPORT TO
SHAREHOLDERS 10 (2014), available at https://materials.proxyvote.com/
Approved/00817Y/20140328/AR_204030/#/1/.
289
Letter from Mark Bertolini, Chairman, CEO and President of Aetna, to
Aetna S’holders, in AETNA, supra note 289.
290
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2014), available at
http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/2013-annual-report/Default.aspx.
291
Health Insurance CEO Pay, supra note 287.
292
Murphy, supra note 287. Aetna explained its CEO’s compensation, more
than double his compensation a year earlier, as the result of restricted stock and
options, granted as a one-time award in 2013. Id.
293
Health Insurance CEO Pay, supra note 287 (see, attached source, Bar
Graph: 2013 Health Insurance CEO, CMS Administrator, and Average Worker
Compensation).
288
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ance company excesses, the law clearly hasn’t curtailed
top executive pay.” 294
The dramatic economic success enjoyed by the health insurance industry
has benefitted a comparatively small group of exceedingly high paid officials and administrators, but not the bulk of industry employees. In the
same years (2012 and 2013) that the average health insurance industry
CEO had an annual compensation package worth $11,627,188 (2012)
and $13,866,571 (2013), respectively, the average worker in the industry
earned $34,645 (2012) and $35,239 (2013). 295
b. Moving Money to the Top
More generally, in the United States, the lion’s share of healthcare
funding goes to “the business of medicine” and not to the provision of
health care. 296 A stunningly large part goes to the pharmaceutical industry. 297 A large part of that funding goes to the insurance industry298 and
some part to hospitals. 299 Some, but far less, goes to physicians. And
physicians in primary care specialties such as internal medicine, pediatrics, and family medicine earn less than physicians in a set of subspecialties such as orthopedic surgery, cardiology, and dermatology. 300
The top-heavy business model that shapes the healthcare system in
the United States precludes the nation from achieving the “triple aim” –
the provision of high-quality care and better health at a sustainable
294

Health Insurance CEO Pay, supra note 287 (quoting Benjamin Day, Director of Organizing at Healthcare-NOW!, described as “a nonprofit group that
advocates for a single-payer system”).
295
Id. During the same period, hospital executives and administrators have
fared similarly well. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Doctor’s Salaries Are Not the Big
Cost, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2014, at SR4. As a group, industry and hospital executives, and even many administrators, have benefitted from compensation
packages that are significantly larger than the annual income of many physicians. Id.
296
Rosenthal, supra note 296.
297
In 2012, profits in the many billions of dollars were claimed by the eleven most financially successful pharmaceutical companies. Thom Hartmann, 11
Major Drug Companies Raked in $85 Billion Last Year, and Left Many to Die
Who Couldn’t Buy Their Pricey Drugs, ALTERNET (Apr. 30, 2013), available at
http://www.alternet.org/11-major-drug-companies-raked-85-billion-last-yearand-left-many-die-who-couldnt-buy-their-pricey.
298
See supra notes 296–305 and accompanying text.
299
See supra note 305 and infra note 316 and accompanying text.
300
In 2013, orthopedists earned an average of $413,000; cardiologists, an
average of $351,000; dermatologists, an average of $308,000; pediatricians, an
average of $ 181,000; and family doctors, an average of $176,000. Leslie Kane
& Carol Peckham, Medscape Physician Compensation Report 2014, MEDSCAPE
MULTISPECIALTY (Apr. 15, 2014), available at http://www.medscape.com/
features/slideshow/compensation/2014/public/overview#2.
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301
cost. A comparison to other nations frames the high price the United
States pays for the slew of mediators at the center of its healthcare system. 302 The administrative costs of health care in the United States are
much higher per capita than those of other rich countries. 303 In other developed nations, the best hospitals have thinner administrative staffs, and
pay a far smaller percent of healthcare costs for administrative support
than is the case in the United States. 304 Theodore Marmor and colleagues
reported in 2009 that other nations work expressly to diminish industry’s
interest in increasing healthcare costs:

All other rich democracies concentrate purchasing power to counter the medical industry’s efforts to increase
costs. If, as in Canada and Sweden, overall medical
costs are on public budgets, then officials have powerful
incentives to restrain increases in medical costs to avoid
reducing the funds for other public programs or having
to raise taxes. In other countries, such as Germany and
France, insurers are nongovernmental entities (sickness
funds) that are financed through payroll contributions
from employers and employees. The governments of
these countries regulate insurers and help them control
costs. 305
In the United States, between one-fifth and almost one-third of the nation’s spending on health care goes to supporting the “business” of medicine – the nation’s healthcare industry and hospital executives and administrators. 306 Almost none of this improves the quality of care or the
population’s health, and in the nature of the case, none controls
healthcare costs. As Marmor, Oberlander, and White declared in the year
before the passage of the Affordable Care Act:
If the United States is to control health care costs, it will
have to follow the lead of other industrialized nations
and embrace price restraint, spending targets, and insurance regulation. Such credible cost controls are, in the
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language of politics, a tough sell because they threaten
the medical industry’s income. 307
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
It is not the fact of medical necessity determinations that undermines
good health outcomes at sustainable prices in the United States. It is the
larger healthcare system within which those determinations are rendered.
Coverage decisions are essential and must be made on the basis of medical necessity determinations. The notion of medical necessity, in the abstract, is unproblematic. Its concretization, however, can only be as effective at producing good health care at a sustainable cost as the political
and economic system within which medical necessity determinations are
entertained.
In that regard, efforts at healthcare reform in the United States since
the middle of the twentieth century have been wanting. In response to
political exigencies, Congress granted the insurance industry a key position in implementing Medicare. That fateful decision has shaped important components of the U.S. healthcare system for the last half century. 308 The Affordable Care Act strengthened industry’s role within the
309
Although the Act has placed significant
nation’s healthcare system.
limits on insurers, it leaves the central task of rendering coverage decisions to industry. It also has created a new marketplace for insurance
companies to sell their products, and, through the “individual mandate,”
it requires most people without coverage to purchase insurance in that
marketplace. 310
William Sage’s assessment in 2003 – that into the foreseeable future,
medical necessity determinations would reflect a diverse set of clinical,
ideological, economic, and political factors 311 – continues to serve as an
accurate assessment of medical necessity determinations today. That assessment, and its implications, are not challenged by the Affordable Care
Act. 312 Passage of the Act has re-aligned components of the U.S.
healthcare system, but it has not transformed the basic framework. Medical necessity determinations will continue to be inconsistent, and sometimes hard to justify or unfair. Consequently, the risk survives that medical necessity determinations can be maneuvered by industry to move
money to the top rather than distributing it through the provision of
health care to the covered population.
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This Part suggests two sets of responses. One assumes that the Affordable Care Act, and the healthcare system that, in large part, it inherited and reinvigorated, will continue to broadly structure the delivery of
health care in the United States. The other assumes, more felicitously,
that real change is still possible, and that health care in the United States
need not support the interests of insurance companies and of the
healthcare industry more generally. 313 Both responses redesign the mode
through which medical necessity determinations are rendered, suggesting
that the process must become transparent and access to all determinations and justification for all denials must be easily available to clinicians, patients, and the broader public.
A. Under the Affordable Care Act
The Affordable Care Act mentions medical necessity only briefly, in
three places, 314 and leaves intact the insurance industry’s control of these
determinations. The Act fails to address the risk this structure creates – a
risk that emerged clearly in the 1980s and 1990s – of decisions that serve
industry’s interests rather than those of population health. As was the
case before passage of the Affordable Care Act, a lack of coordination
and of transparency at the heart of the system for determining coverage
is costly, encourages inconsistency, and does not serve the basic goals of
a first-rate healthcare system. 315
The availability of external review – guaranteed by the Affordable
Care Act – is essential, but not sufficient, to protect patients from unfair,
inconsistent medical necessity determinations, and it will not help develop a coherent method for making coverage decisions that protect population health. 316 Most medical necessity appeals focus on the facts of spe-
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317

cific cases rather than broad legal concepts. Sara Rosenbaum has distinguished medical necessity determinations resulting from categorical
exclusions and those embedded in interpretations of particular stories.
“Appealable cases,” she explained, “rest on factual questions to be resolved by a decision maker.” 318
More important still, transparency must be built into the process of
reaching medical necessity determinations, and access to those determinations must be afforded to clinicians, patients, and the public. 319 Particularly, in light of the central role that the insurance industry continues to
play under the Affordable Care Act, it is more important than ever that
insurance companies’ medical necessity determinations are consistent
and that the factors driving the decisions are open to public purview.
Were the entire process to become transparent, with a report of determinations and justifications for them – especially for denials – made readily available, the risks of inconsistency, unfairness, and abuse could be
controlled.
Further, physicians’ medical decisions for their patients, assuming
they do not contravene the terms of a patient’s plan, should only rarely
be denied by payers. Claim disputes should be restricted to situations of
apparent fraud or incompetence. An efficient mode of communication
between treating physicians and payers must be developed to facilitate
such an approach to claim denials. 320 A cogent system for electronically
reporting health information might provide a mode for easy communication between the two groups. Comparative effectiveness research can
provide guidelines for reasonable medical necessity determinations. 321
However, such standards should be taken to inform, not control, physicians’ medical decisions for patients. And the focus of the standards must
be “clinical effectiveness” at least as much as “cost effectiveness.” 322
B. New Possibilities for Healthcare Reform in the United States
In the first decade of this century, far-reaching reform of the nation’s
healthcare system was stymied by a combination of public preferences
317
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(among a significant part of the nation’s population) and industry lobbying. 323 As a result, the Affordable Care Act, passed in 2010, has largely
institutionalized existing methods of delivering and paying for health
care. 324
Taking that route also meant that the nation failed to take advantage
of models developed elsewhere that have produced more robust
healthcare systems than currently exists in the United States. Some nations, such as Sweden and Canada, control costs by incorporating health
care into the national budget. 325 Others, such as Germany, have combined private and public segments to create the nation’s healthcare system, 326 yet enjoy lower costs and better health than does the United
States. 327
Essential to the success of many other nation’s healthcare systems
has been open communication and robust, but respectful, debate among
the stakeholders. For instance, in Germany, healthcare prices are negotiated among hospitals, physicians, and sickness funds. One outcome is
that standard fees are set. 328 In Germany, where healthcare costs are
329
lower than in the United States, and the population is healthier, standard fees apply to hospitals and to other forms of health care intervention. 330 National standards and open negotiation among stakeholders
about coverage and costs would advance the United States along the
road toward achieving the triple aim of higher quality health care, better
health, and lower costs. 331
323
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More specifically, many nations that offer universal health care, at a
sustainable cost, provide for the active participation of clinicians in designing and implementing the process through which coverage decisions
are made. Several look, in particular, to senior, respected healthcare officials to render guidance on coverage determinations. 332 In Canada,
333
where health care is universal and coverage is comprehensive, part of
the success of the healthcare system can be attributed to the centrality of
the medical profession in the operation of the healthcare structure. 334
The Israeli healthcare system costs far less per capita than that of the
United States and provides high quality care. Israeli law guarantees
“universal health insurance coverage” 335 to every resident of the nation
(citizen and non-citizen). 336 The government provides a “basket” of services that are paid for by premiums and taxes. 337 A government committee – the so-called “Healthcare Basket Committee” is charged with determining which medical services are provided. 338 In the early years, the
Committee faced a variety of stumbling blocks, including dissatisfaction
from the public. But over time, the Committee’s work has gained respect.
A key to the comparative success of the approach is that Committee
members – drawn from the ministry of health, the nation’s medical association, the budget division of the treasury, and the public – work by
consensus. 339 Furthermore, serving on the Committee is viewed as a
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340
“public service” but not as an enviable task. This seems to be one fac341
tor that ensures the system’s success : those who determine which
medical interventions are covered do so for the sake of the public good,
not for personal benefit or the benefit of commercial interests.
Each of these nations – Germany, Canada, and Israel – as well as
many others, has forged an approach to coverage decisions that is transparent and that depends on negotiation, compromise, and the active participation of physician groups in determining the scope of healthcare
coverage. None of these countries gives the sort of sweeping power to
private industry to make decisions that determine the reach of healthcare
coverage that the United States gives. These nations all pay significantly
less per capita for health care than does the United States, and each enjoys better health outcomes than does the United States. 342

CONCLUSION
In designing the Medicare program, Congress empowered the health
insurance industry with far-reaching responsibility for, and control over,
an essential component of the nation’s healthcare system. The legislation
creating the program allowed the industry to make basic decisions about
healthcare coverage and thus, in effect, about the provision of health care
for Medicare participants. The result, over time, has been to place almost
all of the nation’s medical necessity determinations in industry’s hands.
That power is, in effect, the power to design the scope of healthcare coverage. Even more, in the half century since Medicare’s passage, Congress has several times strengthened industry’s hand. At least for a time,
ERISA’s protection for self-funded healthcare plans seemed to place
those plans’ medical necessity determinations virtually outside the reach
of court review. 343 Most recently, the Affordable Care Act, itself shaped
in significant part by the health insurance industry’s effective lobby, de340
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signed the state exchanges as a marketplace for insurance companies.
Each of these provisions granted the insurance industry, sometimes perhaps unwittingly, remarkable control over healthcare coverage decisions.
The power to wield the tool that determines who gets health care for
which interventions is basic to the success or failure of health care in the
United States.
The Affordable Care Act has largely been implemented, 345 and is not
soon likely to be significantly amended so as to limit industry’s control.
This stymies the possibility for far-reaching reform that might appropriate, and build on, the successful healthcare-payment and delivery models
in effect in other nations. Several of those, if implemented in the United
States, would very likely improve care while controlling costs.
Less sweeping changes are, however, possible and should be made.
Most important, the process through which medical necessity determinations are entertained must become transparent. A database that is easy to
access, and easy to interpret, should be developed. 346 Simply posting all
claim determinations online is inadequate. The database should contain
information about each medical claim, the reviewers’ response to each
claim, and the justification for all denials. Each piece of information
must be easily identifiable. Medicare’s coverage database provides a
start – at least for that program’s claims. 347 But it is difficult to use the
database to understand which claims are likely to be denied and what
justifies categories of denials; it only provides information about national determinations; and it applies only to Medicare claims. Broad access
to a national database that can be easily searched and that extends beyond Medicare claims is needed. If the information were presented in a
manner that would allow patients and providers to understand the scope
of and justification for claim denials, the database would significantly
further fairness and consistency in medical necessity determinations.
In sum, medical necessity determinations have shaped the nation’s
healthcare system for many decades. Yet, the process through which these determinations are reached has remained largely hidden from public
view. That has facilitated determinations that further private economic
gain and partisan ideological ends rather than the health of individual
patients and the population more broadly. Increased transparency and
access to information about the processes through which such determina344
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tions are reached is necessary to stop the flow of resources to commercial interests 348 and thus to provide adequately for the health of the nation’s population.

348

These interests include those of the insurance industry, and even more,
those of the pharmaceutical industry. See Rome, supra note 314.

